"Avoiding a Future of Unemployment and Low Wages: What Opportunities Are Open to Young Unskilled Workers?" by Robert M. Hutchens
Avoiding  a Future  of Unemployment  and Low  Wages: 
What Opportunities  Are Open 
to Young Unskilled  Workers? 
Robert  M. Hutchens* 
Working  Paper  No.  100 
October  1993 
*Research  Associate,  The Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute and Professor,  School of Industrial and Labor  Relations, 
Cornell  University. 
This  research  was  sponsored  by  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Insititute.  I  am  grateful  to  Angela  Mikalauskus, 
Yoshio  Okunishi,  and Annika  Sunden  for Assistance  with aspects  of the research. Table  of Contents 
I. Introduction  and Summary 
Ii. Recent  trends  in skills 
III. Literature  Review 
IV. An Analysis  of the NLS Young Men 
V. Comparing  the NLS Young Men 
with  the NLS Youth  Cohort 
VI.  Policy 
VII.  Conclusion 
Bibliography 
Tables 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . , 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
page  1 
page  5 
page  12 
page  21 
page  33 
page  43 
page  55 
page  56 
page  60 1 
Avoiding  a Future  of Unemployment  and Low Wages: 
What  Opportunities  Are Open  to Young Unskilled  Workers? 
The U.S.  occupational  structure  continues  to shift  toward jobs  that 
require higher  levels  of education  and cognitive  skill.  Job opportunities  in 
occupations  that require  few cognitive  skills  -- occupations  like service 
station  attendant  or elevator  operator  -- are disappearing.  This raises  a 
fundamental  labor market  policy  problem:  what will happen  to workers  who,  in 
an earlier  time, would have become  service  station  attendants  or elevator 
operators?  After  all, not everyone  is willing  or able to prepare  for jobs 
that require  cognitive  skills.  Each year  there emerges  from the nation's 
high  schools  a cohort  of young people with  low reading  and mathematical  test 
scores.  Many  are dropouts  who will never  again step into a classroom.  What 
will happen  to these people?  Are  they consigned  to a life of unemployment 
and low wages,  or are there paths by which  some fraction will  find a degree 
of financial  security? 
This paper  examines  that issue.  In particular,  it examines  the 
importance  of three career paths by which  a young person  with  limited  academic 
credentials  may  avoid a life of unemployment  and low wages.  The three paths 
are  (1) obtain  additional  formal  schooling,  (2) obtain  a job  that provides 
secure  employment  at "good" wages,  and  (3) obtain  a job that provides  skills 
and thereby  opens  a door to good future jobs.  The paper  examines  whether 
these are viable  paths  for academic  "underachievers,"  and whether  access  to 
these paths has changed  through  time. 
The paper begins  with  an investigation  of recent  trends  in skill 
requirements.  Section  II first documents  the trend toward  a job structure 2 
that requires  ever greater  cognitive  skills.  It then examines  the supply 
side of the labor market,  noting  that the past  two decades  have witnessed  a 
rather  significant  improvement  in educational  attainment.  Despite  this 
supply-side  response,  the bottom  essentially  dropped  out of the market  for 
unskilled  labor.  Young  high  school  dropouts  suffered  a significant  decline 
in real wages.  As  indicated  in Section  II, there is good reason  to expect 
this process  to continue  into the future. 
Section  III reviews  a literature  that is particularly  relevant  to the 
notion  of paths  to success.  It examines  the debate  about whether  there ever 
really  exist  "good" jobs,  and concludes  that efficiency  wage  theories  provide 
a theoretical  basis  for jobs  that provide  secure  employment  at above-market 
wages.  The section  closes with  a review  of the empirical  literature  on "good" 
jobs. 
Section  IV examines  data from the National  Longitudinal  Survey  of Young 
Men  (NLS-YM).  The analysis  focuses on men who were  18-19  in 1966, and who had 
not completed  twelve years  of education  by their nineteenth  birthday.  Using 
the NLS-YM,  it is possible  to not only examine  the success  of these academic 
underachievers  at age 33-34, but also the paths  that they followed.  Three 
conclusions  come out of this work: 
1.  The majority  of these young men did not obtain  additional  formal 
schooling.  Indeed, as best  can be determined  with  these data, many  did 
not obtain  any other  form of additional  training. 
2.  Although  additional  training  in 1966-71 appears  to pay off with  a 
somewhat  higher  probability  of full-year  employment  and above-poverty 
earnings  in 1978-81,  the relationship  is weak.  Failure  to pursue 
additional  training  does not carry a large penalty;  many  of the young 
men who did not pursue  additional  training  ended up with  full-year 
employment  and above-poverty  earnings  in 1978-81. 
3.  There  is some evidence  of a link between  industry  and occupation  of 
early jobs  and later success.  In this population,  work  in the 
construction  industry  and in clerical  and kindred  occupations  tended  to be associated  with a higher  probability  of later success.  Yet  the 
statistical  links are not strong. 
Section V continues  the empirical  analysis with  data  from the 1979 
National  Longitudinal  Survey Youth  Cohort.  The goal  is to determine  whether  a 
more  recent  vintage  of young men had different  experiences  than the earlier 
1966 vintage.  Once again  the analysis  focuses on men who were  18-19 at the 
start of the survey,  and who had not completed  twelve years  of education  by 






As  in the earlier  cohort,  the majority  of nongraduates  in the 1979 
cohort  do not obtain  additional  formal  schooling  or any other  form of 
training. 
There  is some evidence  that the more recent  cohort was  less likely  to 
obtain  employer  provided  training. 
The more  recent  cohort was much  less successful  in attaining  full-year 
employment  and above-poverty  earnings. 
As  in the earlier  cohort,  additional  training  appears  to pay off with  a 
somewhat  higher  probability  of full-year  employment  and above-poverty 
earnings.  With possible  exception  of employer  provided  training, 
however,  relationships  are quite weak.  Once again,  failure  to pursue 
additional  training  evidently  does not carry a large penalty. 
As  in the earlier  cohort,  there is weak  evidence  of a link between 
industry  and occupation  of early jobs and later success.  Yet  industries 
and occupations  that matter  in the early cohort  cease  to matter  in the 
more  recent  cohort.  There  is no evidence  of a stable  subset  of jobs 
that consistently  serve as a pathway  to later success. 
These  results  do not convey  an image of unobstructed  paths  to success. 
Rather  they convey  an image of academic  underachievers  trying  to navigate  a 
maze  of ill-marked  paths,  some leading  to above-poverty  earnings  and some not. 
While  training  and certain  early jobs may be statistically  associated  with 
later success,  the linkages  are weak and uncertain.  Moreover,  the set of jobs 
that lead to success may change  over time in unpredictable  ways. 
These  academic  underachievers  confront  a difficult  labor market.  The 
results hint  at the possibility  that future success depends  less on what you 4 
do than who you are.  Success may depend  less on the path  taken,  than on the 
characteristics  of the navigator. 
Section  VI considers  the issue of government  policies  that could  assist 
young  people  with  limited  academic  skills  and achievements.  It concludes  that 
the most beneficial  policy  would be  to sharply  reduce  the supply  of unskilled 
labor.  Not only will  this have  the beneficial  effect  of raising  the wage paid 
to unskilled  workers,  but  it will  also force employers  to either  eliminate  or 
restructure  unskilled  jobs.  There  are several ways  to implement  this 
strategy.  Of particular  importance  are, 
-- Expanded  efforts  at enhancing  early education. 
-- Training  vouchers  for young  adults. 
-- Restrictions  on immigration  of unskilled  workers. 
Section VI also considers  demand  side interventions,  and essentially 
concludes  that, with  some exceptions,  these should be avoided.  The above 
noted  evidence  indicates  that it will be difficult  for governments  to identify 
clusters  of jobs  that unambiguously  lead to financial  security  for people  with 
limited  academic  skills.  Moreover,  even if such jobs could be  identified, 
demand  side  interventions  frequently  have side-effects  that reduce  job 
opportunities  for unskilled  workers.  Supply  side intervention  makes  the most 
sense. 
People with  limited  academic  skills or credentials  often reside  at the 
bottom  of the earnings  distribution.  As cognitive  skills become  more 
important,  these people  confront  a labor market  that is increasingly 
characterized  by unemployment  and low wages.  Neither  training  nor early jobs 
provide  straight,  unobstructed,  paths  to employment  and above-poverty  earnings 
for this population.  There  is no simple  solution  to the problem.  Government policy  should  aim at reducing  the size of the problem  by reducing  the size of 
the unskilled  population. 
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II. Recent  Trends  in Demand  and Supply  for 
In recent  decades,  unskilled  workers 
Jobs  like servant  or gas station  attendant 
Unskilled  Workers 
faced declining  job opportunities. 
declined  in number,  while  jobs  like 
manager  or computer  programmer  expanded.  The structure  of jobs  essentially 
shifted  toward  one requiring  greater  cognitive  skills.  According  to the 
Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  this shift will continue  into the next  century. 
This  shift  toward  greater  skill requirements  can be viewed  as the 
product  of two forces.  First,  the skills  required within  specific  jobs 
increased.  For example,  over time the job  "nursing" has  increasingly  required 
knowledge  of computers.  Second, unskilled  jobs contracted  and skilled jobs 
expanded  so that the mix of jobs changed.  For example,  the number  of 
in manufacturing  contracted  while professional  services  (e.g., lawyer 
accountant)  expanded. 
laborers 
or 
This change  in skill requirements  can be documented  with  data from the 
Occuoational  Outlook  Handbook.  The Handbook  specifies  the educational 
requirements  of almost  300 occupations.  For example,  a job as an engineer 
requires  at least a bachelor's  degree, while  a job as a shoe-repairer  or a 
truck driver  requires  no formal education  or training.  Since  the Handbook  is 
published  annually,  it chronicles  changes  in the educational  requirements 
occupations  through  time. 
Using  the Handbook  it is possible  to assess  the level of education 
of 
required  by  the current  stock of jobs.  Table  1 presents  data from two papers 
that used  the Handbook  to examine  changes  in educational  requirements.  In 6 
1960 only  15.3 percent  of the workforce  held jobs  that  (according  to the 1960 
Handbook)  required  a college  degree.  When a similar number  is computed  for 
1986 using  the 1986 Handbook,  27.3% of all workers  are in occupations 
requiring  a bachelor's  degree.  These numbers  re.flect  both  of the forces noted 
above,  i.e., they reflect both  changes  in the skills  required  within 
occupations,  as 
Data  from 
way  to document 
well as changes  in the mix of occupations. 
the Dictionarv  of Occunational  Titles  (DOT) provide  a second 
changing  skill requirements.  The 1977 DOT measures  several 
dimensions  of skill  for some 12,000 job titles.  These  can be  gathered  into 
occupational  groups,  and used  to assess  the extent  to which  changes  in the mix 
of occupations  affect  skill requirements.  Howell  and Wolff  (1991) present  a 
particularly  insightful  version  of this exercise.  They begin  by grouping  the 
DOT data  into four variables: 
General  Educational  DeveloDment.  A DOT index of mathematical,  language 
and reasoning  skills. 
Substantive  Comnlexitv.  A factor analytic  index based  on DOT measures 
of required  verbal  and numerical  aptitude,  specific vocational  training 
time,  temperament  for nonrepetitive  activities,  and temperament  for 
activities  of an abstract  and creative  nature. 
Interactive  Skills.  A DOT index of the extent  to which  a job requires 
"people"  skills.  These  range from "high" skills of mentoring  and 
negotiating  to "low" skills  of serving and taking  instructions. 
Motor  Skills.  A factor  analytic  index based  on DOT measures  of required 
motor  coordination,  manual  dexterity,  and ability  to set up machines  and 
perform  precision  manual  work. 
Howell  and Wolff  then assign  these variables  to 267 occupations  and calculate 
averages  for the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1985 workforce.  Since  they rely on a 
single DOT  (the 1977 DOT),  their analysis  can not capture  the effect  of 
changes  through  time in the skill requirements  within  occupations.  Rather, 
the analysis  only reflects  changes  in skill requirements  due to changes  in the mix of skilled  and unskilled  occupations. 
Table  2 presents  the Howell  and Wolff  data on growth  rates  for the four 
skill measures.  The positive  growth  rates  in the table indicate  that, with 
the exception  of motor  skills,  skill requirements  increased  through  time. 
Thus,  the economy  is moving  toward an occupational  mix that demands  higher 
cognitive  skills  and lower motor  skills.  Interestingly,  these data suggest 
that this process  may be slowing  down;  the growth  rates tend to become  smaller 
with  time.  However,  that may be an artifact  of data that do not capture 
changes  in skill requirements  within  occupations. 
A key  factor underlying  the trends  in Tables  1 and 2 is the expansion 
and contraction  of occupations.  Between  1979 and 1989 the fastest  growing 
occupation  was computer  and data processing  services,  which  doubled  its 
employment  share  (from 0.3% in 1979 to 0.7% in 1989).  Most jobs  in this 
occupation  require  substantial  cognitive  skills.  The declining  occupations 
are mainly  found  in manufacturing,  for example, handlers  and laborers  in the 
rubber  and plastics  industry.  Such occupations  emphasize  motor  skills  over 
cognitive  skills.  One can, however,  oversimplify  this story.  Although  job 
opportunities  tend to be growing  in sectors  that require  comparatively  high 
cognitive  skills,  that is not always  the case.  The industry  adding  the most 
jobs between  1979 and 1989 was eating  and food establishments,  which  to a 
large extent  consists  of low-skilled  jobs such as cook or waiter. 
The trend  toward higher  skill requirements  is likely  to continue  into 
the future.  The last row of Table  1 presents  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS) 
projections  of educational  requirements  in 2000.'  The predicted  increase  in 
educational  requirements  is largely due to predicted  changes  in the 
1 Silvestri  and Lukasiewicz  (1989). 8 
occupational  distribution.  The BLS predicts  rapid growth  in professional 
specialty  occupations,  which  require high  levels of education  and training, 
and slow or negative  growth  in occupations  requiring  less education  and 
training.  For example,  the employment  share of operators,  fabricators,  and 
laborers  is expected  to decline. 
These  BLS projections  are not, however,  without  controversy.  Mishel  and 
Teixeira  (1990) claim  that the increase  in skill requirements  will be  less 
than indicated  by  the BLS.  In part  they argue  that the growth  in high  skilled 
occupations  will be counterbalanced  by a shift toward  low-skilled  jobs. 
cite as evidence  the fact that service  occupations  are projected  to make 
large contribution  growth  in total employment  between  1984 and 2000, and 
these occupations  often require  few skills.2  In contrast,  Bishop  (1992) 
They 
that 
claims  that future  skill requirements  will be greater  than those projected  by 
the BLS.  Bishop  evaluates  BLS projections  during  the 198Os, and demonstrates 
that the BLS prediction  methodology  underestimated  the rapid growth  in high 
skill jobs  and overestimated  growth  in low-skilled  jobs.  Given  that BLS 
predictions  for the year  2000 are based  on the same methodology,  Bishop 
concludes  that BLS  is underestimating  the trend toward higher  skills. 
At  the same time that employers  are requiring  a more  educated  workforce, 
employees  are acquiring  more education.  The past  two decades witnessed  a 
rather  significant  improvement  in educational  attainment,  particularly  at the 
lower levels.  The first three columns  of Table  3 present  data on the 
educational  attainment  of the workforce  in 1973, 1979, and 1988.  Note  the 
decline  in male high  school  dropouts.  In 1973 males without  a high  school 
degree  constituted  almost  a fifth of the workforce.  By 1988 this had been  cut 
2 Mishel  and Teixeira  (1990), page 22. 9 
in half.  A similar  phenomenon  occurred  for women. 
One reason  for this improved  educational  attainment  is the increased 
attainment  of young workers.  The three columns  on the right hand  side of 
Table  3 indicate  educational  attainment  for people with  less than ten years  of 
potential  experience  in the labor force.  Potential  experience  indicates  the 
number  of years  a person  could have been  in the labor force after  completing 
school;  it  is  computed  as age minus years of schooling  minus  six.  Note again 
the decline  in male high  school  dropouts.  Whereas,  in 1973 8% of the young 
males  in the workforce  were  dropouts,  by 1988 that had declined  to 5%.  In 
general,  over  this fifteen year period,  young  cohorts were much more  likely  to 
both  graduate  from high  school  and enroll  in college.  This  is particularly 
true for women. 
Of course,  such  increases  in years  of schooling  do not necessarily  mean 
improvements  in actual  skills.  One hears  enough  about  illiterate  high  school 
graduates  to be cautious  about  the above statistics.  But other data suggest 
that more  schooling  has,  indeed,  translated  into improved cognitive  abilities. 
Tables  4 and 5 present  data on the reading  and math  skills  of 17-year  old high 
school  students.  Consistent  with  the much discussed  trends  in the Scholastic 
Aptitude  Test,  these data  indicate  little change  in the upper  tail of the 
distribution.  There  is, however,  considerable  improvement  at the lower end; 
an increasing  share of these high  school  students  can read and solve problems 
at the basic  and intermediate  level.  The improvement  is particularly  dramatic 
for blacks,  a fact that accords nicely with  the decline  in black high  school 
dropout  rates.3 
3 See Blackburn,  Bloom, and Freeman  (1990) for additional  evidence  on this 
point. 10 
One can, perhaps,  make  too much of this improvement.  Cognitive  skills 
may have  improved  even more  dramatically  prior  to 1970.  Moreover,  educational 
achievement  in the U.S.  apparently  lags behind  competitors  like Germany  and 
Japan.  Finally,  the lack of improvement  at the high  end of the cognitive 
skill distribution  is cause for concern.  Still,  the point  remains:  in recent 
years  the cognitive  skills  of the labor force have,  on average,  increased. 
And  it is likely  that cognitive  skills will  continue  to improve.  There 
is considerable  political  pressure  for improved public  schools.  Moreover,  as 
discussed  below,  the labor market  imposes heavy  economic  penalties  on people 
with  few cognitive  skills.  Thus,  gradual  increases  in cognitive  skills  -- 
particularly  at the lower levels  -- can be expected  to continue  into the 
future. 
To summarize  the above discussion,  demand  side changes  are creating  an 
economy  that requires  increased  levels of cognitive  skill.  Although  supply 
side changes  are producing  a better  educated workforce,  most of the 
improvement  is at the'  lower end of the cognitive  skill distribution.  This 
leads logically  to the question  of whether  the increase  in demand  is 
outstripping  the increase  in supply. 
Data on wage  trends provide  insights  into that.  Table  6 follows  the 
format  of Table  3; it presents  data from Bound and Johnson  (1992) on real 
hourly  wages  for 1973, 1979, and 1988.4  The principal  message  in this table 
is that over the past  two decades  the bottom  dropped  out of the market  for 
low-skilled  labor.  As  indicated by the three left-hand  columns  of Table  6, 
4 To obtain  their wage  data, Bound and Johnson  estimate  a wage  regression 
in each of their 32 sex, education,  experience cells for each of the three years. 
They  then  predict  the  mean  log  wage  in  each  period  for  each  cell,  holding 
relevant worker  characteristics  fixed. 11 
for all male high  school  dropouts  the real hourly  wage dropped  from $10.48  to 
$8.31,  a 22% decline.  The three right-hand  columns  indicate  that the collapse 
was even more pronounced  for young high  school dropouts.  Their wages  dropped 
from $7.52  to $5.54,  a 27% decline.  Note  that college  graduates  did not meet 
a similar  fate.  Although  they suffered wage  losses during  the 1970s  (when the 
baby boom  cohort  entered  the labor market),  their wages bounced  back  in the 
1980s.  Indeed, Table  6 is consistent  with  the hypothesis  that people  with 
greater  cognitive  skills were  less likely  to suffer wage  losses  over the past 
two decades.  Alternatively  stated,  the table suggests  that the increased 
demand  for cognitive  skills  did,  indeed, outstrip  supply. 
Will  the labor market  for unskilled  workers  continue  to deteriorate? 
Probably.  Powerful  economic  forces  lie behind  the demand  side shift toward 
greater  cognitive  skills,  and these forces are likely  to continue.  Included 
here  are the microchip  revolution  and the trend toward  greater  international 
trade.  Computers  and robots  can increasingly  perform  the repetitive  work  of 
unskilled  labor.  Moreover,  international  trade will arguably  result  in less 
demand  for goods produced  by American  unskilled  workers.  This  is because 
third world  countries,  with  their abundant  supplies  of unskilled  labor, have a 
comparative  advantage  in such goods.  Of course,  the expanding  service  sector 
may provide  jobs  for workers  with weak  cognitive  skills.  If the above  logic 
is correct,  however,  these jobs may well be characterized  by declining 
relative  (and perhaps  real) wages. 
Given  this,  it is reasonable  to speculate  that opportunities  for upward 
mobility  have  declined  for lower skilled workers.  Some available  evidence 
does,  indeed,  lend support  to such hypotheses.  A recent work by Laura 
Leete-Guy  (Leete-Guy,  1992) uses the 1966 NLS Young Men and the 1979 NLS Youth 12 
Cohort  data  to investigate  five year changes  in earnings  and occupation  for 
young males who had completed  their education.  She finds that in 1980s  there 
was  less occupational  advancement  or wage  growth  than in the 1970s.  This was 
particularly  true for people  without  any college  education. 
A study by Robert Moffitt  and Peter Gottschalk  (Moffitt and 
Gottschalk,  1993) uses different  data to come to a similar  conclusion. 
Employing  the Panel  Study of Income Dynamics,  Moffitt  and Gottschalk  find 
evidence  of a decline  in earnings  mobility  (measured as movement  between 
quintiles  of the earnings  distribution)  over the last twenty years. 
According  to their data,  this decline  in earnings  mobility  was particularly 
severe  for the bottom  quintile  of the earnings  distribution.  Moreover,  the 
bottom  quintile  experienced  declining  mobility  in both  the 1970s and the 
1980s. 
Thus  )  there  is good reason  to predict  that unskilled  workers  will  face 
an increasingly  difficult  labor market.  Both real wages  and opportunities 
for upward  mobility  are likely  to decline  in the future. 
III. Literature  Review 
How can a young person  with  few academic  skills  or credentials  escape  a 
fate of declining  real wages  and unemployment?  Since some high  school 
dropouts  succeed  in reaching  a comfortable  standard  of living,  escape  routes 
must  exist. 
Escape  could  involve  finding  the right job.  A good job might  provide 
training  that opens up other opportunities  at other firms.  Alternatively, 
obtaining  a job with  a growing  or stable  firm  (e.g., Micro-Soft  or a local 
hospital)  could yield job security  and a life of rising  real wages.  Do there 13 
exist a set of easily  identified  jobs  that provide  opportunities  for upward 
mobility  to people  with  few academic  skills or credentials? 
This  section  investigates  the literature  on this issue.  It focuses  on 
the debate  over whether  there ever really  exist  "good" jobs.  This debate, 
which has been  going on for more  than a century,  questions  whether  a job with 
premium  pay and/or  desirable  working  conditions  can persist  in a 
competitive  market.  While  that may seem an abstract  diversion  from the 
issues  that underlie  this paper,  in fact it is directly  relevant.  To posit 
an identifiable  set of jobs  that provide  opportunities  for upward  mobility, 
is to raise  the question  of whether 
workers.  Since  that question  lurks 
follows,  it needs  to be examined. 
these are "good" jobs  or simply  "good" 
beneath  the surface  of much of what 
In this discussion  of good jobs  the focus is on jobs  that workers 
identify  as desirable,  even before  they enter  them.  Such jobs could be called 
"ex ante good jobs."  Workers  do not simply discover  that these jobs are 
desirable  once they are in them; even before  taking  the job, workers  know  they 
are desirable.  As  such, this discussion  does not deal with  the literature  on 
matching.5  Although  there are good jobs  in that literature,  they are not ex 
ante good jobs.  Rather,  good jobs arise out of employers  and employees 
gradually  learning  about each other.  Bad matches  are dissolved  and good 
matches  ultimately  result  in premium wages.  Neither  the worker,  the firm, nor 
an outside  researcher  can determine  ex ante whether  a specific worker  will 
obtain  a good match  at a specific  firm. 
For purposes  of investigating  the literature,  this section  focuses  on 
' For example,  see Jovanovic  (1979, 1984), Heckman  and Honore  (1990), and 
Heckman  and Sedlacek  (1985, 1990). 14 
nonunion  jobs.  That  is essentially  because  there is broad  agreement  that 
union jobs  are often ex ante good jobs.  Unions  raise wages  above market 
levels,  and workers  know  about  the high wages  even before  they get into such 
jobs.  I focus here  on the more controversial  question  of whether  there exist 
ex ante good jobs  in the nonunion  sector. 
A. One Side of the Debate:  Success Depends  on the Worker,  not  the Job 
Some argue  that there only exist good workers,  and that good jobs are 
but a chimera.  To make  the argument,  consider  a group of identical workers 
in a labor market  where  jobs  involve a simple  task like picking  tomatoes. 
Assume  that information  is perfect  in the sense that workers  know all about 
the characteristics  of potential  employers.  Now,  suppose  that one of these 
workers  finds a job  that pays a higher  wage  than is received  by  the other 
workers.  This  sets in motion  market  forces  that will  eventually  wipe  out the 
pay differential.  In particular,  given perfect  information,  some of the lower 
paid workers  will  seek employment  at the high wage job.  The employer  who 
offers  this high wage job will  realize  that identical  labor could be obtained 
at less cost.  There will  then be strong  incentives,  based  on cost 
minimization,  for that employer  to reduce  the wage. 
This  is simply  the "Law of One Price"  applied  to labor markets.  Just  as 
identical  chewing  gum should have  the same price  in the same market, 
identical  labor  should have  the same price  in the same market.  Of course 
higher  quality  labor  (more trained, more motivated,  more  talented)  will 
command  a higher  price,  just as higher  quality  chewing  gum will  command  a 
higher  price.  Thus,  there will  only exist  good workers,  not good jobs. 
Similar  logic applies  to situations  where jobs differ  in their amenities. 15 
Suppose  that a new  firm comes  into this market.  The firm pays  the same wage 
as other  firms, but provides  more pleasant  working  conditions  (e.g., longer 
lunch breaks  in better  dining  facilities).  Once again,  the identical workers 
in other jobs will  seek these jobs.  Although  the wage  is the same,  the 
amenities  are better.  The employer  with  the more pleasant  working  conditions 
will  realize  that identical  labor can be obtained  at less cost, and there 
will be  strong  incentives  for that employer  to drop his wage.  Thus,  the job 
is no  longer  a "good" job.  There  is a "compensating  wage  differential." 
Although  the job has more pleasant  amenities,  workers  must  effectively  pay 
for those amenities  by accepting  a lower wage. 
Now suppose  that yet another  new firm comes 
pays  the same starting wage  as other firms, but 
future wage  growth  and employment  security  than 
into this market.  This  firm 
offers  greater  opportunity  for 
other  firms.  Once again,  this 
is a "good" job.  And once again,  as the identical workers  in other  firms seek 
this job,  the employer  will  face strong  incentives  to drop his  starting  wage. 
The wage  should ultimately  fall to the point where  the job  is no longer  a 
"good" job.  Although  the job has 
employment  security,  workers  must 
accepting  a lower starting wage. 
greater  opportunities  for wage growth  and 
effectively  pay for these amenities  by 
By such logic,  there  is no such thing as a good job  that provides 
opportunities  for upward  mobility  to young people with  limited  academic 
skills  and credentials.  Such opportunities  for upward mobility  would 
be a job amenity.  If an employer  provided  such a job,  then there would  arise 
a "queue" of young people  outside  the door of that employer.  The employer 
would  realize  that identical  labor could be obtained  at less cost, and would 
effectively  ask workers  to pay for the job. 16 
B. The Other  Side of the Debate:  Success Depends  on both  the Worker  and the 
Job 
For more  than a century,  economists  have argued  the validity  of the 
above  logic.  Included  as critics  are John  Stuart Mill, John R. Commons, 
Kerr,  Peter Doeringer  and Michael  Piore.  The essence  of their critique 
Clark 
iS 
that some workers,  who are qualified  for desirable  jobs,  only have  limited 
access  to them.  There  is, in fact, a "queue" of workers  hoping  to get into 
these jobs.  Yet despite  the fact that the number  of qualified  people  hoping 
to take these jobs  exceeds  the number  of jobs  that are offered,  wages  do not 




employer,  seeing  this queue of workers,  not simply  drop the wage  to 
level? 
past  decade  several  economists  have  tried to answer  this question 
by  invoking  "efficiency  wages."  They argue that by raising  the wage  above 
market  levels,  the firm reaps a gain in the form of increased  productivity 
and profit.  Queues  persist  because  it is profitable  to pay above-market 
wages.  There  really  are ex ante good jobs out there. 
As  the debate  over such ideas intensified,  efficiency  wage  theories 
increased  in both number  and sophistication.  Here  I simply  illustrate  the 
nature  of the debate by discuss  two salient examples:  shirking  models  and 
turnover models. 
The shirking  variant  of the efficiency  wage model posits  employers  with 
limited knowledge  of worker  behavior.  In particular,  employers  can not 
always  determine  whether  workers  are behaving  in ways  that raise costs. 
Workers  may  shirk on the job without  the employer  seeing  it.  They may 
6 See Cain  (1976) for a review. 17 
misfile  folders  or abuse machines  without  the employer  being  able to 
determine  who  is at fault.  They may steal with only a small probability  of 
capture.  By paying  high wages  and firing workers  who are caught  shirking  or 
stealing,  the employer  can reduce  such behavior.  Workers  who contemplate 
shirking  or stealing  must  consider  the consequence  of possible  capture  and 
loss of a future  stream  of above market  wages.  The greater  the wage premium 
and the greater  the probability  of capture,  the less likely  are workers  to 
shirk or steal.  While  higher  wages may be expensive  to the firm,  the 
reduction  in shirking  and stealing may be sufficiently  large to raise 
profits.  Thus,  the firm pays above-market  wages  and a queue of potential 
workers  forms outside  the door of the personnel  office. 
Jobs with  efficiency  wages  are good jobs.  Not only do they pay premium 
wages,  but  employers  try to avoid cyclical  or seasonal  layoffs.  This  is 
because  incentives  for good behavior  are strongest  when workers  see a stream 
of above market  wages  stretching  far into the future.  Of course,  not all jobs 
will pay  these efficiency  wages.  In some jobs shirking  is not costly  to the 
employer  and stealing  is of minimal  importance.  For example,  plastering  is 
easily monitored  by a supervisor  (who can count the number  of square  feet 
plastered  in a day) and theft of materials  is presumably  a rather minor 
concern.  Other jobs, particularly  those in the financial  sector, may be more 
difficult  to monitor  and more  likely  to involve efficiency  wages. 
A second variant  of the efficiency  wage model  arises when employers  bear 
large hiring  and training  costs  (e.g., Salop,  1979).  If employers 
must pay  for hiring  and training,  they will  seek to minimize  quits.  A quit 
for such employers  is like a windfall  loss.  When hiring  workers,  these 
employers  anticipate  a future  return  from their investment  in hiring  and 18 
training.  When  a worker  quits,  that anticipated  return  is lost.  The employer 
must hire  a new worker  and invest again.  By paying  above-market  wages,  the 
employer  can reduce  quits and thereby effectively  minimize  the chance  of 
such windfall  losses.  Thus, premium  wages  raise productivity  by reducing 
costly  quits.  If the reduced  cost of quits  is large enough  to outweigh  the 
increased  cost of higher  wages,  then premium  wages  are cost minimizing,  and 
queues  persist. 
Once again,  not all firms will use efficiency  wages.  Only a firm that 
bears  large hiring  and training  costs would pursue  such policies.  Firms with 
unique  and complex  technologies,  or unique  and complex  relationships  to 




relation  firms. 
part because  they violate  the law of one price,  economists  often 
skeptical  view  of efficiency  wage  theories.  The critics make  logical 
counter  arguments.  In particular,  they claim that once that queue  forms 
outside  the door of a firm paying  efficiency  wages,  market  forces will 
eventually  eliminate  the good job.  Seeing  the queue,  the cost minimizing 
employer  could  quite possibly  charge  a fee to newly hired workers.  Before 
hiring  or training  costs are incurred,  or before  there is any opportunity  to 
shirk or steal,  the employer  asks prospective  employees  for a payment  of, say, 
$5,000.  Since  the job  is better  than alternative  jobs, workers  are willing  to 
pay  this fee.  Of course,  once work begins  the job pays a premium  wage.  That 
is necessary  for preventing  shirking,  stealing,  or quitting.  But because 
workers  pay a fee before  work begins,  the job is no better  than any other  for 
which  the workers  are qualified.  Note  that by collecting  this fee the firm 
makes higher  profits  and succeeds  in preventing  shirking,  stealing,  or quitting.  Thus,  say the critics,  efficiency  wages 
out hiring  fees.  Indeed,  some take the argument  a 
only make  sense  if we rule 
step further,  arguing  that 
19 
since we but  rarely  observe hiring  fees, efficiency  wages  must not exist. 
While  proponents  of efficiency  wage  theories make  interesting 
rejoinders,'  that need not concern us here.  The key point  is that there are 
plausible  reasons  to claim  that good jobs exist, but  the debate  is far from 
settled. 
C. Evidence 
One might  reasonably  ask whether  empirical  evidence  could help  to 
resolve  this debate.  Several  authors have made efforts  along  these lines.8 
At  this point  there  is substantial  evidence  consistent  with  the existence  of 
ex ante good jobs.  Several  recent papers  examine wage  differences  across 
industries  after controlling  for a multitude  of worker  characteristics  (e.g., 
age, education,  experience,  occupation).'  These  studies  find industry wage 
differentials  that are large,  that tend to tend to persist  over time, and that 
are correlated  across  countries.  Such evidence  is certainly  consistent  with 
the claim  that jobs  in high wage  industries  tend to be good jobs. 
A related  strand  of the literature  finds that wages vary with  firm 
size.  Holding  observable  worker  characteristics  constant,  large firms tend 
to pay more  and provide  more  stable jobs  than small firms.  Moreover,  there 
is evidence  that queues  form for jobs  in large firms  (Holzer, Katz,  and 
’  See 
8  See 
for useful 
9 See 
Dickens  et. al.  (1989) or Weiss  (1990). 
Murphy  and Topel  (1989), Weiss  (1990), and Dickens  and Lang  (1992) 
summaries  of the empirical  work. 
Dickens  and Katz.1987  and Krueger  and Summers  (1988). Krueger,  1991).  After  a detailed  examination  of the relationship 
size and wages,  Brown  and Medoff  (1989) essentially  conclude  that 
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between  firm 
the 
relationship  is difficult  to explain.  It can not be wholly  attributed  to the 
quality  of workers  in large firms,  to unpleasant  working  conditions  in large 
firms.  or to union  avoidance  strategies.  Again,  jobs  in large firms have  the 
markings  of ex ante good jobs. 
A third strand  of the literature  suggests  that jobs with  employer 
provided  training  tend to be good jobs.  Several  studies  indicate  that when a 
company  provides  training,  workers  benefit  through higher  wages  and lower 
turnover.lO  Although  orthodox  theory  suggests  that workers  will pay  for this 
training  through  lower  initial wages,  several  tests of that hypotheses  fail to 
find support  for it."  Thus,  the available  evidence  indicates  that jobs with 
company  training  tend to be ex ante good jobs.  Evidently,  a worker  who 
obtains  such a job can expect higher  lifetime  earnings,  on average,  than would 
be possible  in jobs without  this training. 
Yet, while  a great deal of evidence  points  to the existence  of ex ante 
good jobs, none  of it is completely  convincing.  Those who question  the 
existence  of such jobs  argue  that high wage  industries  or firms employ higher 
quality  -- more productive  -- workers.  Even when econometricians 
statistically  control  for quality with variables  like years  of education  or 
years  of experience,  that only captures  a part of the true variation  in worker 
quality.  Worker  productivity  varies  for reasons unobserved  by  the 
statistician,  and that unobserved  component  may contribute  to the wage 
lo  See Duncan  and Hoffman  (1978), Brown  (1989), Lillard  and Tan  (1986) 
Mincer  (1988), Lynch  (1992a, 1992b). 
l1  See Barron,  Black and Lowenstein  (1989) and Parsons  (1989). 21 
differential.  Indeed,  according  to Murphy  and Topel  (1989), industries  that 
tend to pay higher  wages,  ceteris paribus,  also tend to employ workers  with 
observable  characteristics  (like education)  that are usually  associated  with 
greater  productivity:  If these industries  are paying  for observable  quality 
differences,  then they are quite probably  also paying  for unobservable  quality 
differences. 
Moreover,  none  of this evidence helps  determine  the validity  of the 
available  efficiency  wage  theories.  There  is some evidence  that higher  wages 
lead to lower dismissal  rates  (Cappelli and Chauvin,  1991), but  that evidence 
does not permit  us to say whether  higher  wages  raise profits,  nor does  it 
indicate whether  higher  wages  reduce  shirking  or simply  attract  a better 
behaved  class  of workers. 
To conclude,  economists  have  long argued  over whether  there ever really 
exist  "good" jobs.  There  are plausible  theoretical  reasons  for both 
predicting  and doubting  the existence  of a cluster  of jobs  that lead to upward 
mobility  for academic  underachievers,  and the available  empirical  literature 
does not  fully clarify matters.  Perhaps  the key point  is that, at present, 
there  is no theoretical  or empirical  basis  for ruling  out the existence  of 
such jobs.  The subsequent  empirical  work essentially  examines  whether  the data 
are consistent  with  that hypothesis. 
IV. An Analysis  of the NLS Young Men 
As noted  in the introduction,  a young person with  few academic  skills 
and credentials  is not without  options.  There would  seem to be  three career 
paths by which  that person  could avoid a life of unemployment  and low wages. 
In particular,  (1) obtain  additional  formal schooling,  (2)  obtain  a job 22 
that provides  secure  employment  at "good" wages,  and  (3) obtain  a job  that 
provides  skills  and thereby opens a door to good future jobs.  The goal of 
this section  is to examine  the extent  to which  an earlier  cohort  of young 
unskilled  men went  down these several paths  and actually  attained  a degree 
of economic  success.  The analysis  is built  on the National  Longitudinal 
Survey  of Young Men  (the NLS-YM).  The NLS-YM  began with  a representative 
sample  5,225 young men between  the ages of 14 and 24 in 1966, and followed 
these young men  through  a final interview  in 1981.  One major  advantage  of the 
NLS-YM  is that it tracks  a cohort  of labor market  entrants  for fifteen years 
(1966 - 1981).  In contrast,  the more recent NLS Youth  Cohort  (which is used 
in Section V)  is currently  limited  to eleven years  of data  (1979 - 1990). 
A. Early Training  Paths and Later  Success  -- Cross Tabulations 
In order  to examine  the economic  success of young men with  few academic 
skills  and credentials,  it is first necessary  to identify  these young men  in 
the data.  They could,  for example,  be  identified by examining  arithmetic  or 
verbal  test scores  at  (say) age seventeen.  It would be  interesting  to know  to 
what  extent  people  with  low test scores  succeed  in avoiding  lives of 
unemployment  and low wages.  Unfortunately,  available  panel  surveys  do not 
contain  sufficient  data to implement  that idea.12 
Instead,  this project  focuses  on nongraduates:  people  who reached  their 
nineteenth  birthday  without  completing  twelve years  of education.  This group 
l2  The Panel Study of Income Dynamics does not contain information  on verbal 
or arithmetic  test scores. Although  the National Longitudinal  Surveys young male 
data  contains  information  on  IQ  tests  and  the  NLS-Youth  Cohort  contains 
information on the Armed Services Vocational  Aptitude Battery, both surveys have 
major problems with missing data. Moreover,  the tests used in the two surveys are 
not comparable. 23 
essentially  starts  off on the wrong  foot; they have  less formal  education 
than most people  in their age cohort.  Some are dropouts  and some have been 
forced  to repeat  grades.  As demonstrated  below,  most will  end up in the lower 
tail of the income distribution.  Of course, not all of these nongraduates  are 
lacking  in academic  skills.  Some may be nongraduates  because  they suffered  an 
illness.  Others  may have  chosen  to not graduate  in order  to pursue  other 
interest  (e.g., a career  in professional  tennis).  Still,  for purposes  of 
examining  the career  paths  of academic  underachievers,  nongraduates  are a good 
-- albeit  not  ideal  -- group to look at. 
An examination  of economic  success  also requires  criteria  for success. 
Since several  alternatives  are feasible,  the subsequent  analysis  takes a 
somewhat  eclectic  view  of criteria  for success.  The three used here are, 
SUCCESS  1: Annual  earnings  in excess  of the U.S.  government's  poverty 
line for a family  of four.  In 1992 this was $13,950.  Men with  this 
level of earnings  can support  a non-working  spouse  and two children 
without  being  in poverty.  Attainment  of this level of success will 
usually  require  a full-time  job that pays more  than the minimum  wage. 
SUCCESS  2: Annual  weeks worked  greater  than or equal  to 48 and annual 
earnings  in excess  of the U.S.  government's  poverty  line for a family  of 
four.  People  that meet  this definition  have both  steady work  and 
above-poverty  earnings. 
SUCCESS  3: Annual  earnings  in excess  of $20,000  in 1980.  In 1980 
$20,000 was  slightly  above the median  earnings  for a full-time  year 
round male worker. 
Since the NLS-YM  data suffer  from sample  attrition  and missing 
observations,  in most cases annual  earnings  or annual weeks worked  were 
calculated  as averages  over the 1978, 1980, and 1981 surveys.  If data from 
one survey was missing,  then a two year average was used.  Similarly,  if data 
on two years was missing,  then a single year was used.  This helps  to 
alleviate  problems  with missing  observations. 
Finally,  for purposes  of analyzing  the paths  taken to economic  success, 24 
it is necessary  to identify  different  kinds  of training.  The NLS-YM  data are 
rich  in training  information.  In order  to simplify  the analysis  and to 
maintain  comparability  with  the NLS-Youth  Cohort  data,  this work  focuses  on 
three types of training  as reported  in the 1967-71  interviews: 
COMPLETED  MORE YEARS  OF SCHOOLING:  This variable  takes the value  one if 
the respondent  completed  an additional  year of schooling  after his 
nineteenth  birthday.  Otherwise  it is zero.  The additional  schooling 
could  involve  completion  of high  school,  a year  in a community  college, 
or pursuit  of university  degree. 
OBTAINED  OTHER TRAINING  PROVIDED  BY THE EMPLOYER:  The NLS-YM  asked 
respondents  about  the source  of their longest  spell of occupational 
training  in the past year.  This variable  equals  one if a respondent 
indicated  that he obtained  training  from a company  training  school. 
Otherwise  it is zero.  Note  that this variable  focuses  on formal 
training.  It will  tend to miss  less formal  types of on-the-job 
training,  such as that provided  by a foreman or by coworkers. 
OBTAINED  OTHER TRAINING  -- MISCELLANEOUS.  This variable  equals  one if a 
respondent  indicates  that the source  of his  longest  spell of 
occupational  training  is other  than a company  training  school. 
Otherwise  it is zero.  Thus,  it includes  training  from business 
colleges,  barber  schools,  correspondence  courses,  and so forth. 
Table  7 presents  data on the training paths chosen by young  men who were 
18-19  in 1966 and did not complete  twelve years  of schooling  by  their 
nineteenth  birthday.13  The most  striking  result  in the table pertains  to the 
absence  of additional  training.  Fully 70% of these men completed  no 
additional  years  of schooling between  1966 and 1971, and most of the 70% did 
not obtain  any other  form of training.  In fact, fully 51% of the sample 
report no additional  formal  or informal  training.  For those who obtain 
additional  training  outside  of the school  system,  there is almost  an even 
split between  employer  provided  and miscellaneous. 
Table  8 presents  data on the number  of young men  in Table  7 who  reached 
l3 These  numbers  are  computed  with  sample  weights.  The  total  number  of 
observations  is 155. 25 
SUCCESS  2, i.e., they not only had  1978-81 average  earnings  above  the four 
person  poverty  line, but were  employed  48 or more weeks  during  the year.  Note 
that the sample  size in this table is 62% of that in Table  7 (265,490/426,352 
=  .62 ), implying  that only 62% of the Table  7 workers  succeed  in obtaining 
1978-81 jobs  that satisfy  SUCCESS  2.  The percentages  in Table  8 look quite 
similar  to those  in Table  7.  The bulk  of the "successful"  people  in this 
population  completed  no additional  years  of schooling  (66% of the sample), 
and fully half  of the successes  obtained  no other observable  form of training. 
Table  9 provides  information  on success  rates for the several paths.  The 
first column  uses  the same criterion  for success  that is used  in Table  8, 
i.e., earnings  above  the poverty  line and 48 or more weeks  of work.  Perhaps 
the most  surprising  result  in this table pertains  to nongraduates  who pursued 
no other  training  between  1966 and 1971.  Fully 59% of these young men ended 
up working  full time with  earnings  above  the poverty  line in 1978-81.  At 
least  in this simple  cross-tabulation,  there appears  to be only a weak  link 
between  early  training  and later success. 
These  three tables provide  us with  the first conclusion  from this study. 
At  least for this cohort  of nongraduates,  formal  training was not critical  for 
full employment  and above poverty  earnings.  There must have been paths  to 
success  that either  involved  another  form of training  -- a form of training 
not picked  up by  the survey  -- or that had some other  feature  that produced 
upward  mobility. 
B. Early Training  Paths and Later  Success  -- Multivariate  Models 
Multivariate  statistical  model provide  another way  to examine which 
training  paths have  the highest  success rate.  Unlike  the Table  9 cross- tabulation,  multivariate  methods  such as 
of relationships  holding  other variables 
linear regression  permit 
constant.  Thus,  one can 
which  training  paths were most  successful, 
and other variables. 
Table  10 presents  linear  regressions 
holding  constant  race, age, region, 
using  SUCCESS  1 as the dependent 




1978-81  average  earnings  are above  the poverty  line for a family  of four. 
Because  they are simpler  to interpret,  linear regressions  are used here  rather 
than the statistically  more  appropriate  logit or probit.  It is unusual  for 
coefficient  estimates  in a logit or probit  to differ  greatly  from those in a 
linear  regression  in terms of either  coefficient  sign or statistical 
significance. 
The model  in Column  1 of Table  10 essentially  replicates  the Table  9 
cross-tabulation.  It uses  the same sample and training  path categories.14 
The second  coefficient  (.214) in Column  1 indicates  that,  in comparison  to 
someone with no additional  training,  a person with  additional  formal  schooling 
(and no other  form of training) has a  214 percentage  point higher  probability 
of "SUCCESS  1."  The third coefficient  (.395) indicates  that,  in comparison  to 
someone with no additional  training,  a person who both  obtained  additional 
formal  schooling  and company  training has a  .395 percentage  point higher 
probability  of SUCCESS  1.  Note  that the first two coefficients  are 
statistically  significant  at conventional  levels. 
In interpreting  these coefficients,  it is important  to recognize  that 
the higher  probability  of success associated  with  training may not be caused 
l4  The results  differ  somewhat because  the Table  9 data are weighted  while 
those  in Table  10 are not. 27 
by  training  per se.  This higher  probability  may be, at least  in part, 
attributable  to the characteristics  of people  who pursue  training.  There  is a 
"selection  process"  at work here.  If the people who pursue  training  tend to 
be more motivated,  or tend to have  greater  cognitive  skills  than those who do 
not,  then the estimated  coefficients  will  reflect  that. These  coefficients 
essentially  combine  the effects  of training with  the effects  of the unobserved 
characteristics  of people  who obtain  training. 
Column  2 in Table  10 adds control variables  to the regression,  and 
thereby holds  other variables  constant.  Although  the coefficients  on the 
training variables  are quite  similar  to those in Column  1, their magnitudes 
(and t-statistics)  drop somewhat.  Thus,  controlling  for observed 
heterogeneity  in the population  (e.g., race, region,  disability,  etc.) 
diminishes  the Column  1 training  effects.  Indeed, none of the Column  2 
training  coefficients  are statistically  significant  at conventional  levels. 
Of course,  this could be an artifact  of sample  size.  In focusing  on 
males who were  18-19 in 1966, the analysis  is restricted  to 155 
observations.  A larger  sample would yield more precise  coefficients.  Thus, 
Column  3 examines  the effect  of expanding  the sample  to include males who 
were  16 - 19 in 1966.  Note  that the number  of observations  now jumps  to 405, 
and that while  the coefficients  on the training variables  are quite similar  to 
those  in Column  2, some t-statistics  are larger. 
The fourth  and fifth column  in Table  10 explore  the effect  of adding 
other control variables  to the model.  The model  in Column  4 adds variables 
indicating  participation  in the military  between  1966 and 1971.  Since the 
military  often provides  training,  a case can be made  for treating 
these variables  as indicators  of training.  However,  since  there was both  a 28 
draft and war between  1966 and 1971, these variables  probably  also  indicate 
other phenomena  besides  training.  Note  that due to missing  data,  the sample 
size drops  from 405 to 360.  Note also that the coefficients  on variables 
indicating  completion  of additional  formal education  decline  in magnitude. 
This could  arise  if nongraduate  males who were  in the military  tended  to 
pursue  additional  formal  education  during  or shortly  after  their military 
service. 
The model  in Column  5 includes  information  on parental  education  as well 
as a measure  of individual  IQ.  Again,  because  of missing  data,  the sample 
size drops  dramatically.  In consequence,  little  should be made of this model. 
Two key conclusions  come out of Table  10.  First,  even after controlling 
for  demographic  variables  (like race, age, region,  and disability),  training 
undertaken  between  1966 and 1971 affects  the probability  that nongraduates 
have  1978  - 1981 earnings  above  the poverty  line.  Thus,  training  matters. 
But, second,  other variables  may matter  more.  In particular,  race and the 
highest  grade completed  at age nineteen  are strongly  related  to the subsequent 
"success"  of these nongraduates.  Additional  regressions  that use other 
definitions  of success yield  results  that are consistent  with  these 
conclusions. 
C. Early Jobs  and Later  Success  -- Multivariate  Models  with  Industry  and 
Occupation 
As  indicated  in Tables  7 and 8, although many of these academic 
underachievers  do not complete  additional  formal  schooling,  a large share 
ended up  in full time jobs  that provided  earnings  above  the poverty  line.  How 
did they do that?  One way  to look at this is to examine whether  the industry 29 
and occupation  of early jobs  influence  later success.  As noted  in Section 
III, an extensive  empirical  literature  finds large industry wage  differences 
that persist  over  time.  The literature  often  links these differences  to 
efficiency  wages.  As  such,  it is reasonable  to think that early  attachment  to 
specific  industries  and occupations  may translate  into higher  probabilities  of 
later success. 
It must, however,  be acknowledged  that there are other  features  of early 
jobs  -- features  other  than industry  and occupation  -- that may  influence 
later success.  Included here  are size of company  or union  status.  Such 
characteristics  are, however,  almost  certainly  correlated  with  industry  and 
occupation.  For purposes  of examining  whether  early jobs  influence  later 
success,  industry  and occupation  provide  a good point  of departure. 
To investigate  the importance  of early  industry  and occupation,  I 
estimated  models  of the form, 
(1) Y - X'B + Z’A  +  e 
where Y is a measure  of success, X is a vector  of demographic  and personal 
characteristics,  Z is a vector  of variables  indicating  industry  and 
occupation  of early jobs,  B and A  are parameter  vectors,  and e is a random 
error.  So that results  are not confounded  by formal  schooling,  the models  are 
estimated  in the population  that did not complete  additional  years  of formal 
schooling  between  1966 and 1971. 
Since  the analysis  is based  on panel  data, the industry  and occupation  of 
early jobs will be measured  in terms of time spent in an industry  or 
occupation.  Thus,  instead of using  industry  and occupation  "dummy" variables, 
the analysis  is based  on the fraction  of the five years between  1966 and 1971 
that an individual  spent  in a specific  industry or occupation.  Suppose,  for 30 
example,  that there are three  industries:  industry A,  industry  B, and industry 
C. If an individual  spent l/5 of the 1966-71  time period  in industry A, 4/5  in 
industry  B, and no time in industry C, then data for that individual  would 
take the form, Industry  A -  .2, Industry  B -  .8, Industry  C - 0. 
Column  1 of Table  11 presents  coefficients  on the industry  and 
occupation  variables  (Z) in equation  1 when  SUCCESS  1 is the dependent 
variable.  The model  uses broad  industry and occupation  categories.  Similar 
results  obtain when narrower  categories  are used.  The model  is estimated  in a 
sample  of male nongraduates  age 16-19 who did not complete  additional  years  of 
formal  education.  Although  there  is considerable  variation  in the 
coefficients,  the t-statistics  are quite small.  Indeed, using  an F-test  one 
can not reject  the null hypotheses  that all of the coefficients  in Column  1 
are zero.  This  is in part due to small sample  size.  With  only 247 
observations,  it is not possible  to obtain  sufficiently  precise  estimates  of 
the coefficients  to reject  the null hypothesis. 
One way  to improve  the precision  of the estimated  coefficients  is to 
include high  school  graduates  in the sample.  The model  in Column  2 of Table 
11 does this.  The coefficients  in this model  are estimated  in a combined 
sample  of male high  school  graduates  and nongraduates  who did not complete 
additional  formal  education  after  their nineteenth  birthday.  Using  an F-test 
one can reject  (at a  .05 level)  the null hypothesis  that all of the 
coefficients  in Column  2 are zero.  Thus, at least  in this larger  sample, 
there  is evidence  that early jobs are related  to later success.  An additional 
test indicates  that the Column  1 and Column  2 coefficients  are statistically 31 
similar.15  That  is not particularly  surprising.  It simply  indicates  that 
regardless  of high  school  graduation,  young males who do not pursue  further 
formal  education  confront  a similar  relationship  between  early jobs  and later 
success.  Given  these results,  this section  focuses on the larger  sample. 
The Column  2 estimates  indicate  that some early jobs  are more  likely  to 
lead to success  than others.  Since the excluded  industry  is agriculture, 
fishing,  and forestry,  the industry  coefficients  should be  read as indicating 
differences  in success  for people  who work  in a given  industry  relative  to 
people  who work  in agriculture,  fishing,  and forestry.  Thus,  the first 
coefficient  in Column  2 (+.204) indicates  that young men who worked  in 
construction  between  1966 and 1971 had a higher  probability  of success  in 
1978-81  than did identical  young men  in agriculture,  fishing,  and forestry.  A 
parallel  interpretation  applies  to the occupation  coefficients.  Here, 
however,  the excluded  occupation  is professional. 
Which  jobs have  the greatest  effect?  Due to statistical  error  in the 
parameter  estimates,  it difficult  to give definitive  answers  to this question. 
The Column  2 data suggest, however,  that young men who obtain  early jobs  in 
the construction  industry  and in clerical  and kindred  occupations  are 
particularlv  likely  to enjoy SUCCESS  1 (earnings above  the four person  poverty 
line).  In contrast  those with  early jobs  in the finance,  insurance,  and real 
estate  industry  and in the occupation,  farmers and farm managers,  were 
particularlv  unlikelv  to enjoy SUCCESS  1. 
The Column  2 parameter  estimates  imply that these effects  could 
be quite substantial.  For example,  the  .204 coefficient  on CONSTRUCTION 
l5 This  is  an  F-test  of  whether,  in  the  pooled  data  in  column  2,  the 
industry  and occupation  coefficients  for the column  1 subset  are statistically 
different  from zero. 32 
indicates  that in comparison  to a job  in agriculture,  fishing,  and forestry,  a 
job  in construction  leads to a 20 percentage  point higher  probability  of 
SUCCESS  1.  In like manner,  the -.  200 coefficient  on FINANCE,  INSURANCE,  AND 
REAL  ESTATE  indicates  a 20 percentage  lower probability  of SUCCESS  1. 
However,  the many  small  t-statistics  in Column  2 give one pause.  There  are no 
clear paths  to success here.  It looks more  like a poorly  marked  path with 
many hazards,  forks,  and detours. 
The remaining  columns  of Table  11 present  parameter  estimates  based  on 
alternative  definitions  of success.  While  the results  are similar  to those 
in Column  2, there are some interesting  differences.  Consider,  for example, 
the third column where  success  is defined  as earnings  above  the poverty  line 
and 48 or more weeks  of work.  The string of positive  industry  coefficients 
indicate  that jobs  in agriculture,  fishing,  and forestry  are particularly 
unlikely  to insure  success by  this definition.  This  is presumably  because 
early jobs  in agriculture,  fishing,  and forestry  are likely  to lead to later 
jobs  in these  industries,  and such jobs  tend to not be  full-year  jobs. 
Due to the selection  process  that matches  workers  with jobs,  these 
results  must be viewed  with a degree  of caution.  Perhaps  success  does not 
depend  upon  industry  or occupation  per se, but rather  on the characteristics 
of the people  who are recruited  into an industry  or occupation.  Perhaps  it is 
the people  in the job that matter,  not the job itself.  The fact that the 
sample  is reasonably  homogeneous  (nongraduate  males  age 16 - 19), the fact 
that the models  control  for several  important variables,  and the fact that the 
results  are quite weak  all would  tend to argue against  this interpretation. 
To conclude,  there is evidence here  of a weak  link between  early jobs 
and later success.  At  least for this cohort, work  in the construction 33 
industry  and  in clerical  and kindred  occupations  tends to be associated  with  a 
higher  probability  of success.  Yet  the statistical  links are not strong. 
One way  to think about  these results  is to ask the following  question: 
Is there a set of jobs  so fundamental  to the upward  mobility  of nongraduates 
that they should be  subsidized  or in some other way encouraged?  Table  11 
provides  no grounds  for answering  "yes" to that question.  Rather  it would 
seem to suggest  an alternative  interpretation.  Academic  underachievers  find 
paths  to success  in many different  industries  and occupations.  While  some 
industries  and occupations  may be more  likely  to lead to success  than others, 
the linkages  are weak  and statistically  insignificant. 
v. 
in 
Comparing  the NLS Young Men with  the NLS Youth  Cohort 
The previous  section  focused on a cohort  that entered  the labor market 
the late 1960s.  In light of the economic  changes  that occurred  in the 
ensuing  decades,  it is natural  to wonder  whether  more recent vintages  of young 
workers  have  similar  experiences.  The 1979 National  Longitudinal  Survey 
Youth  Cohort  can be used  to examine  this.  The NLS Youth  Cohort  is a panel 
survey  of 12,686 young men and women who were  age 14-21 at the beginning 
of 1979.  One can select  16-19 year old nongraduate  males  from these data 
and compare  them to similar young males  in the 1966 NLS Young Men data.  ThiS 
section  presents  that comparison. 
A. Early Training  Paths and Later  Success  -- Cross Tabulations  for Two Cohorts 
What  looks straightforward  in theory can often be difficult  in practice. 
Several  complications  arise  in comparing  the 1966 and 1979 data.  One 
complication  is due to the different  length of the two panels.  Whereas  the 34 
1966 panel  spans  fifteen years  (1966 - 1981), at present  the 1979 panel  only 
spans eleven  years  (1979 - 1990).  In order  to evaluate  success  over similar 
time intervals,  it is necessary  to focus on a nine  to ten year period.  Thus, 
for the 1966 cohort  success  is evaluated  in terms of earnings  in 1975-76;  for 
the 1979 cohort  success  is evaluated  in terms of earnings  in 1988-89.16  In 
consequence  the results  on the 1966 cohort  in this section will  differ 
somewhat  from those  in the previous  section. 
Given  these two samples,  success  can be measured  in much  the same way as 
was done  in Section  IV.  In particular, 
SUCCESS  1: Annual  Earnings  in excess  of the U.S.  government's  poverty 
line for a family  of four. 
SUCCESS  2: Annual  weeks worked  greater  than or equal  to 48 and annual 
earnings  in excess  of the U.S.  government's  poverty  for a family  of 
four. 
For the 1966 cohort,  annual  earnings  are measured  as average  earnings  in 
1975-1976  and the poverty  line is measured  as of 1976  ($5,334).  For the 1979 
cohort,  annual  earnings  are measured  as average  earnings  in 1988-89,  and the 
poverty  line is measured  as of 1989  ($11,662).  S%nce poverty  lines are 
adjusted  for inflation,  the 1976 and 1989 poverty  lines effectively  represent 
the same level of real  income. 
Success  could also be seen in terms of doing better  than other members 
of one's cohort.  For example,  rather  than view  success  in terms of attaining 
some level of real earnings,  success might be viewed  as attaining  a level of 
real earnings  higher  than half  the members  of one's cohort.  To get at this, I 
experimented  with  an alternative  definition  of success, 
l6  In order to maintain  comparability  between  the two surveys the 1990 data 
were not used.  The Young Men survey did not collect  information  on earnings  in 
1977. 35 
SUCCESS  4: Annual  earnings  greater  than the median  money  income of males 
age 30-34. 
For the 1966 cohort, 
For the 1979 cohort, 
Of course,  for 
median  earnings  are measured  as of 1976  ($13,062)." 
median  earnings  are measured  as of 1989  ($23,663).la 
purposes  of comparing  early  training  for the two 
cohorts,  it is important  to measure  the training variables  in similar ways. 
As before,  three  types of training  are examined: 
COMPLETED  MORE YEARS  OF SCHOOLING:  This variable  equals  one if the 
respondent  completed  an additional  year of schooling  after his 
nineteenth  birthday.  Otherwise  it is zero. 
OBTAINED  OTHER TRAINING  PROVIDED  BY THE EMPLOYER:  This variable  equals 
one if a respondent  indicated  that he obtained  occupational"  training 
from a company  training  school  of more  than four weeks  duration  in the 
past year.  Otherwise  it is zero. 
OBTAINED  OTHER VOCATIONAL  TRAINING  -- MISCELLANEOUS:  This variable 
equals  one if a respondent  indicated  that he obtained  occupational 
training  of more  than four weeks  duration  from someplace  other  a company 
training  school.  Otherwise  it is zero. 
The first variable,  COMPLETED  MORE YEARS OF SCHOOLING,  is identical  to 
that used  in the previous  section,  and there is no real difficulty  in 
obtaining  comparable  measures  for the two cohorts.  The other  two measures 
are slightly  different  from those used  in the previous  section,  and here 
comparability  is more of a challenge. 
Whereas  the earlier Young Men survey obtained  information  on a 
respondent's  longest  spell of occupational  training  since  the last 
l7  U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of the Census, Monev  Income  in 
1976 of Families  and Persons  in the United  States,  Series  P.60, No. 114, 1978, 
Table 46. 
l8  U.S.  Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of the Census, Monev  Income  of 
Households.  Families.  and Persons  in the United  States:  1988 and 1989, Series 
P-60, No. 172, Table  26. 
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interview,  the later Youth  Cohort  survey did not ask respondents  to 
identify  the longest  spell of training.  Rather,  questions  were  asked about 
the most  recent  three spells  of training  since the last interview.  In 
addition,  whereas  the earlier Young Men survey  did not place  restrictions  on 
spell  length,  the later Youth  Cohort  survey  only collected  data on spells  that 
lasted  four weeks  or more.  Thus,  the data obtained by  the two surveys  are not 
strictly  comparable.  In order  to make comparisons,  this section  focuses  on 
training  spells  that lasted more  than four weeks.  Thus,  if a respondent  to 
the  earlier  Young Men survey  reported  that his longest  spell lasted  less than 
four weeks,  that is not treated  as a spell of training.  As a result,  this 
section's  data on OBTAINED  OTHER TRAINING  PROVIDED  BY THE EMPLOYER  and 
OBTAINED  OTHER VOCATIONAL  TRAINING  -- MISCELLANEOUS  will  differ  from the data 
in Section  IV. 
Table  12 is similar  to Table  7 in Section  IV.  It presents  data on the 
training  paths  chosen by  18 - 19 year old nongraduate  males  in the two 
surveys.20  As  in Section  IV, these were nongraduates  in the sense that they 
had not completed  twelve years  of school by their nineteenth  birthday.  In 
both  cohorts,  the majority  of nongraduates  completed  no additional  years  of 
schooling.  Indeed,  the majority  neither  completed  additional  schooling  nor 
pursued  any other  form of training  (57% in the 1966 cohort,  66% in the 1979 
cohort).  If one 
likely  to pursue 
But a degree 
believes  these data, nongraduates  in 1979 were  somewhat  less 
training  than those in 1966. 
of skepticism  is necessary  here.  To understand  why, note 
that while  31% of the 1966 cohort went on for additional  schooling,  only 26% 
2o  In addition,  the military  subsample was excluded 
Cohort. 
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of the 1979 cohort  did so.  Although  this 5% difference  is interesting, 
because  of sample  attrition  it must be viewed  with  caution.  The attrition 
rate  in the 1966 data was  39% while  that in the 1979 data was only 10%.  Since 
attrition  is probably  less likely  among people  who continue  their schooling, 
the 5% difference  may simply  reflect  different  attrition  rates. 
One can be more  confident  in the results  on employer  provided 
training.  Table  12 indicates  that in the more  recent  cohort,  fewer of the 
nongraduates  obtained  employer  provided  training.  This  is true regardless  of 
whether  they pursued  additional  schooling.  Since the 1966 numbers  for such 
training  are probably  too 10w,~l it is unlikely  that this difference  is 
simply  an artifact  of sample  attrition.  Indeed,  the same phenomenon  arises  in 
a sample  of high  school  graduates.22  Thus,  there is evidence  here  that for 
the more  recent  cohort,  young men 
training. 
were  less likely  to obtain  employer  provided 
Tables  13 and 14 present  data on success  rates for alternative  training 
paths.  In Table  13 the indicator  of success  is SUCCESS  1, i.e., annual 
earnings  greater  than the poverty  line for a family of four.  In Table  14 the 
indicator  of success  is SUCCESS  2, i.e., annual  earnings  greater  than the 
poverty  line for a family  of four and 48 or more weeks  of work  during  the 
year.  Note  the differences  in success  rates for the two cohorts.  Looking  at 
Table  13, whereas  75% of the nongraduates  in the 1966 cohort had earnings 
21  Since  the earlier Young Men survey  reports  on only one spell, while 
the later Youth  Cohort  survey  reports  on three spells,  other  things  equal we 
should  observe  fewer training  spells  in the earlier  data. Thus,  the Young Men 
survey  data provides  an underestimate  of what would have been  found had  the 
NLS Youth  Cohort measure  been used. Lynch  (1992b) page  8 provides  evidence 
consistent  with  this. 
22  See Leete-Guy  (1992) for a similar result. Some of this may be due to the 
recession  that occurred  at the beginning  of the 1980s. 38 
greater  than the poverty  line, only 56% of the 1979 cohort  attained  a similar 
level of success.  This presumably  reflects  the decline  in real earnings 
experienced  by  low-skill  workers  in the 1980s. 
The evidence  in these tables  suggest  changes  in the success  rates 
associated  with  different  career paths.  In particular,  whereas  additional 
schooling  was associated  with  a higher  success  rate in the earlier  cohort, 
that is not  the case  in the later cohort.  Looking  at the Table  13, for the 
1966 cohort  88% of those who complete  additional  formal  schooling  attain 
SUCCESS  1, while  for those who do not complete  further  formal  schooling  the 
success  rate  is only 70%.  The corresponding  figures  for 1979 are 54% for 
those who complete  additional  schooling  and 57% for those who do not.  Note, 
however,  that employer  provided  training  is effective  in both  cohorts.  Those 
nongraduates  who obtain  employer  provided  training  tend to have  comparatively 
high  success  rates. 
In summary,  four conclusions  can be drawn  from Tables  12 - 14.  First, 
in both  cohorts  the majority  of nongraduates  tend to not pursue  further 
training.  They neither  report  completion  of additional  formal  schooling  nor 
any other  form of training.  Second,  there is some evidence  that the more 
recent  cohort was  less likely  to obtain employer  provided  training.  Third, 
the 1979 cohort  of nongraduates  was much  less successful  in terms of earnings 
and employment  than the 1966 cohort.  Finally,  at least  in these cross- 
tabulations,  there  is little  evidence  of a link between  additional  formal 
schooling  and later success. 
B. Early Training  Paths and later Success  -- Multivariate  Models 
Of course,  the above cross-tabulations  results do not control  for other 39 
variables  that may  influence  success  rates.  To do that, we need multivariate 
models.  Table  15 presents  multivariate  models  estimated  in samples  of young 
males who had not completed  twelve years  of education  by  their nineteenth 
birthday,  and who were  ages 16-19 at the beginning  of the survey.  (Because of 
this age range,  the samples  are larger  than those  in Tables  12 - 14, which 
were based  on 18-19 year old males.)  The first two columns  present  data on 
sample means.  The samples  are quite similar.  At least, when  looking  at the 
means,  the 1979 cohort  of nongraduates  seems somewhat  advantaged  over the 1966 
cohort.  Fewer of the 1979 cohort  are disabled,  and their average  education  at 
age nineteen  is somewhat  higher  as is the average  education  of their parents. 
The next  two columns  present  linear regression  models  that use SUCCESS  1 as a 
dependent  variable.  Similar  results  are obtained  with  similar  regression 
models  that use alternative  measures  of success  as a dependent  variable. 
The Table  15 regressions  suggest  that the Table  13 and 14 cross- 
tabulations  may be misleading.  Once we control  for demographic  variables 
(like race, age, region,  and disability),  there is no clear  indication  that 
formal  schooling  is becoming  a less effective  route to economic  success. 
Indeed, neither  cohort  yields  strong evidence  linking additional  schooling  to 
higher  success probabilities;  in both  cohorts  the coefficient  on additional 
formal  schooling  (and no other  formal  training)  is positive  but not 
statistically  significant. 
There  is, however,  an interesting  pattern  to the results  on company 
training.  Whereas,  in the 1966 cohort  company  training has  little  effect  on 
subsequent  success,  the 1979 cohort  results point  to a significant 
effect.  The evidence  is weak but  interesting.  Company  training was as 
effective  -- if not more effective  -- for the 1979 cohort  as it was for the 1966 cohort.  But, as indicated  in Table  12, a smaller  proportion  of 
the 1979 cohort  were  likely  to gain access  to it. 
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Several  other coefficients,  such as those on WHITE  or HIGHEST  GRADE 
COMPLETED  WHEN  19 are statistically  significant  from zero and similar  across 
the two regressions.  Indeed,  an F-test  on all of the slope coefficients 
(regression  coefficients  other  than the intercept)  indicates  that one can not 
reject  (at a  .05 level)  the null hypotheses  that these coefficients  are the 
same in the two regressions. 
The conclusions  that come out of Table  15 are quite  similar  to those 
that came out of Table  10 in Section  IV.  Although  there  is evidence  that 
early  training  is associated  with  later success,  other variables  like race and 
highest  grade completed  at age 19 may be more  important.  The only evidence  of 
change  over  time focuses  on company  training.  Company  training  may have been 
more  effective  in insuring  later success  than it was  for the 1966 cohort. 
C. Early Jobs  and Later  Success  -- Multivariate  Models  with  Industry  and 
Occupation 
What  role do early jobs play  in later success?  Using  the NLS-Young  Men, 
Section  IV found evidence  of a weak  link between  early jobs and later success. 
For that earlier  cohort, work  in the construction  industry  and in clerical  and 
kindred  occupations  tends to be associated  with a higher  probability  of 
success.  Do similar  results  obtain  in the later NLS Youth  Cohort  data? 
To investigate  this, multivariate  models  of success  (equation  1) are 
estimated  in the two surveys.  As  in Section  IV the industry  and occupation  of 
an early job  is measured  as a fraction  of the initial  five years  of the panel 
that are spent  in the industry  or occupation.  Also as before,  models  are 41 
estimated  in samples  of male high  school  graduates  and nongraduates  who did 
not complete  additional  formal education  after  their nineteenth  birthday. 
Table  16 presents  results.  The first two columns  list sample means  for 
the two cohorts.  As might be expected,  the more  recent  cohort  is less likely 
to work  in the durable  and nondurable  manufacturing  industries,  and more 
likely  to work  in construction,  wholesale-retail  trade, and services.  With 
regard  to occupation,  there was a major  shift out of the operative  occupations 
and into service  occupations.  A surprise  is the greater  fraction  of  "missing" 
in the more  recent  cohort.  Since these young males  did not go on for further 
schooling,  it is not clear why  there would be an increase  in the fraction  of 
surveys with missing  industry  and occupation  information. 
The next  two columns  of Table  16 present  regression  coefficients  from 
models  of SUCCESS  1.  As  in Table  11, the excluded  industry  is agriculture, 
fishing,  and forestry.  Thus,  the industry coefficients  should be read as 
indicating  differences  in success  for people who work  in a given  industry 
relative  to people  who work  in agriculture,  fishing,  and forestry.  The first 
coefficient  in Column  3 (+.937) indicates  that young men who worked  in 
construction  between  1966 and 1971 had a higher  probability  of success  in 
1975-76  than did identical young men  in agriculture,  fishing,  and forestry.  A 
parallel  interpretation  applies  to the occupation  coefficients.  Here, 
however,  the excluded  occupation  is professional. 
In comparing  Columns  3 and 4, one is struck by how different  the 
coefficients  are.  Industries  and occupations  that tend to be associated  with 
SUCCESS  1 for the earlier  cohort,  cease to be  for the more  recent  cohort.  For 
example, whereas  construction  is strongly  related  to SUCCESS  1 for the earlier 
cohort,  in the more  recent  cohort  the coefficient  is small and statistically 42 
insignificant.  In the more  recent  cohort work  in construction  is almost  as 
likely  to lead to SUCCESS  1 as work  in agriculture,  fishing,  and forestry. 
There  is no clear or consistent  pattern  here.  Indeed,  the squared  correlation 
coefficient  for the numbers  in Columns  3 and 4 is  .049.  That basically  says 
that there  is no statistical  relationship  between  the numbers  in Column  3 and 
those  in Column  4. 
Despite  the many  small t-statistics  in columns  3 and 4, an F-test 
indicates  that  industry  and occupation  of early jobs affect  future  success  in 
both  cohorts.  In both  Column  3 and Column 4, one can reject  at a  .Ol level 
the null hypothesis  that all of the coefficients  are zero.23  Thus,  initial 
jobs matter.  However,  the extent  to which  a specific  industry  or occupation 
affects  future  success  apparently  changes  through  time.  There  is no evidence 
here  of a stable  subset  of initial jobs  that lead to future  success.  Columns 
5 and 6 in Table  16 as well  as columns  1 - 4 in Table  17 yield  similar 
conclusions  for different  definitions  of success:  although  one can reject  the 
null hypothesis  that all of the coefficients  in any one column  are zero,  the 
coefficients  are quite unstable  across  cohorts.24 
An  initial objective  of this research was  to project  how a changing 
industrial  structure  would  affect  future opportunities  for upward  mobility  of 
academic  underachievers.  Given data on changes  in the industrial  composition 
of jobs  through  time, as well  as information  on industries  that lead to upward 
mobility  of academic  underachievers,  one could project  the extent  to which 
23 The  F-statistic  for  the  column  3 test  is 3.928;  that  for  column  4  is 
10.011). 
24  The  squared  correlation  coefficient  for the numbers  in columns  5 and 6 
of Table  16 is .122, for columns  1 and 2 of Table 17 is .012, and for columns  3 
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changes  in the industrial  composition  of jobs alter opportunities  for upward 
mobility  for academic  underachievers.  In light of the results  in Tables  16 
and 17, that exercise  has  little merit.  These  tables essentially  indicate 
that we can not  identify  industries  that lead to upward  mobility  of academic 
underachievers.  Not only  is there a problem  of imprecisely  estimated 
coefficients,  but  the coefficients  appear  to be unstable  through  time.  There 
is no reason  to believe  that jobs  that once resulted  in upward  mobility  will 
do the same in the future.  One would have  little confidence  in projections 
based  on such data. 
To conclude,  the results  in this section  are quite compatible  with  those 
in Section  IV.  That  section  concluded  by asking  the question,  "Is there a set 
of jobs  so fundamental  to the upward  mobility  of academic  underachievers  that 
they should be  subsidized  or in some other way encouraged?"  The answer was 
no.  The evidence  in this section  reinforces  that answer.  Industries  and 
occupations  associated  with upward  mobility  at one point  in time cease  to play 
that role at a later point  in time.  As such, there is no reason  to believe 
that government  will,  at a given moment,  be able to predict  which  set of jobs 
will  lead to later success. 
VI. Policy 
Are  there public  policies  that would help academic  underachievers  move 
toward  greater  economic  security?  In trying  to answer  this question,  it is 
important  to realize  that governments  are already heavily  involved  in this 
area.  Young  people  enter  the labor market with  skills  that are in large part 
shaped by  the public  school  system.  Moreover,  there is considerable 
government  involvement  in adult training  through subsidies  to community 44 
colleges  and public  universities,  and through  training programs  like the Job 
Training  Partnership  Act.  Finally,  the types of jobs available  in the economy 
are shaped by  government  tax and expenditure  policy.  For example,  recent 
reductions  in defense  expenditures  have  eliminated  many  "good" blue  collar 
jobs.  The  issue  is not  then whether  governments  should be  involved, but 
rather what  form of government  intervention  is most  effective. 
Government  policy  in this area can be  thought  of in terms of 
interventions  on the supply  and demand  sides of the labor market.  Supply  side 
interventions  affect  the amount  and mix of skills  that workers  bring  to the 
labor market.  Included here  are education,  training,  and immigration  policy. 
Demand  side interventions  affect  employers  and thereby  the types of jobs 
offered  in the economy.  Examples  of demand  side interventions  are technology 
and trade policy. 
This section  examines  possible  demand  and supply  side policies.  It 
concludes  that, from the perspective  of promoting  opportunities  for academic 
underachievers,  supply  side interventions  make  the most  sense.  Demand  side 
interventions  often  raise more problems  than they solve.  As  indicated by  the 
above evidence,  it is not easy to identify early jobs  that serve as paths  to 
economic  security  for this population.  Moreover,  even  if such jobs  could be 
identified,  demand  side intervention  may have  side effects  that adversely 
affect  low skilled workers. 
Rather,  federal,  state,  and local governments  should  intervene  on the 
supply  side.  They  should pursue  a policy  of sharply  reducing  the supply  of 
unskilled  labor while  expanding  the supply of skilled  labor.  Not only will 
this have  the beneficial  effect  of raising  the wage paid  to unskilled  workers, 
but  it will  also force employers  to either  eliminate  or restructure  unskilled 45 
jobs.  As argued  below,  there are several ways  in which  governments  in the 
U.S.  could  implement  a supply  side strategy.  In particular, 
-- Expand  efforts  at enhancing  early education. 
-- Introduce  training vouchers  for adults. 
-- Sharply  restrict  immigration  of unskilled  workers  into the country. 
While  supply  side  interventions  should be emphasized,  some demand  side 
policies  could be beneficial.  In particular,  unemployment  insurance  deserves 
attention.  At present,  unemployment  insurance  often effectively  subsidizes 
volatile  and temporary  jobs.  By changing  the UI  tax system  and eliminating 
this subsidy,  governments  could encourage  the development  of more  stable jobs. 
A. The Supply  Side. 
Perhaps  the least controversial  way  for governments  to promote  economic 
mobility  is through policies  that raise worker  skill levels.  At  its simplest, 
the theory behind  such policies  is to help workers  attain  a higher  skill level 
and thereby permit  them to attain  a higher  standard  of living.  A more 
elaborate  version  of the theory contends  that policies  that move workers  out 
of unskilled  markets  and into skilled markets  have  the beneficial  effect  of 
causing  the wages  of the unskilled  to rise, ceteris paribus.  Not only does 
this  (a) improve  the standard  of living of those who remain  in the unskilled 
labor market,  but  (b) it forces employers  to either  stop using unskilled  labor 
or restructure  jobs  in ways  that can make  the unskilled  more productive.  This 
could  involve additional  capital,  additional  training,  or alternative 
organization  of work. 
Of course,  such policies  also have costs.  In order  to raise skill 
levels, human  and material  resources  must be allocated  to the training 46 
process.  Moreover,  since an increase  in the supply  of skilled workers  may 
reduce  the wages  in markets  for skilled workers,  some high wage workers  may 
suffer  a decline  in well-being.  Obviously,  society must  decide whether  the 
benefits  of such policies  are worth  the costs. 
In a sense, however,  that decision has already been made.  The  federal, 
state,  and local governments  are deeply  involved  in training  programs  that 
seek to raise  the skill levels of adult academic  underachievers.  Examples  are 
vocational  education  programs,  training programs  that help  dropouts  gain a 
high  school  degree,  and job training programs.  A rather  extensive  body  of 
research  indicates  that these programs  are frequently  ineffective.25  This  is 
especially  true for school  dropouts.  One project  that provided  intensive 
training  to dropouts  and used an experimental  design  to evaluate  the effect  of 
the training,  found that trainees  often did no better  than the 
group.26  Thus,  the issue is not one of whether  the government 
academic  underachievers.  That decision has already been made. 
issue is how  to do this most effectively. 
control 
should  train 
Rather  the 
Two proposals  deserve  serious  consideration.  First,  the best way  to 
minimize  the number  of unskilled  young  adults  in the population  is to enhance 
early  education.  In comparison  to adult education,  early education  is both 
effective  and inexpensive.  Second,  instead of targeting  training  services  at 
academically  unskilled  young  adults,  the U.S.  should move  toward universal 
25  See Bassi and Ashenfelter  (1986) and Osterman  (1992) for useful  reviews 
of the literature. 
26 See  Summary  and  Findings  of  the National  Supported  Work  Demonstration 
(1980). An important  exception  is Job Corps. There is substantial  evidence  that 
the benefits  of this rather expensive residential program exceed the costs. Yet, 
according  to Osterman  (1992), p. 23, recent efforts at operating a program quite 
similar  to Job Corps  (called JobStart)  on a larger scale were 
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vouchers  for post-high  school  education. 
Enhanced  Earlv Education._ 
It is inefficient  to allocate  scarce  resources  to programs  that provide 
adults with basic  reading  and mathematic  skills.  The same skills  can be 
taught with  equal or greater  effect  at younger  ages when  the opportunity  cost 
of student  time is lower.27  At younger  ages  it is often possible  to identify 
and deal with problems  in ways  that do not stigmatize  or isolate.  Indeed, 
compensatory  education  programs  seem to be most effective  at young  ages.2e 
In addition,  basic  reading  and mathematic  knowledge  opens  the door  to other 
skills  (e.g., science  or algebra),  that are part of the portfolio  of skills 
needed  in an increasingly  technological  workplace.  It is inefficient  for 
elementary  school  students  to be  in a position  where,  because  of weak  reading 
and mathematics  skills,  they can not open those doors.  Finally,  students who 
master  basic  reading  and mathematics  when young may be more  likely  to remain 
motivated  and in school. 
Of course,  improved  early education  can not completely  eliminate  the 
problem  of people  who reach adulthood  without  adequate  academic  skills.  There 
will  always be  some ineffective  schools or teachers;  some teenagers  will  drop 
out of school because  of pregnancy  or adolescent  rebellion;  some people  will 
graduate  from high  school without  basic  skills.  Adult high  schools provide  a 
potential  way  to address  this problem. 
Adult high  schools  can help  dropouts  complete  their high  school 
27  See Murnane  and Levy  (1992) and Glazer  (1987) for thoughtful  discussions 
of specific  changes  that could accomplish  this. 
28  See Glazer  (1987), page  172. 48 
education.  These  should be financed by governments  and tuition-free.  They 
should  offer  a curriculum  similar  to that available  in a conventional  high 
school.  They  should be demanding  -- not simply help  students  pass a test like 
the GED.2g  In order  to insure access  ,  these adult high  schools  could be 
organized  as night  schools.  Yet, no matter how well adapted  to the 
circumstances  of adult  students,  such schools may not be very  effective  in the 
sense  that benefits  exceed  costs.  Some students may simply  refuse  to enroll, 
while  other  students  may enroll  and fail.  There would  probably  be a stigma 
associated  with  graduation  from such schools.  To repeat,  the way  to minimize 
the number  of people  who  reach adulthood  without  academic  skills  is to enhance 
early education. 
Vouchers  for Post-High  School Training 
For those who complete  high  school,  the government  should  offer 
universal  vouchers  for post-high  school education.  Citing James  Tobin,  Robert 
Haveman  has proposed  a "universal  personal  capital  account  for youth."  ThiS 
would  involve a "grant of, say, $20,000  to be given to all youth  at age 
eighteen,  to be used  for human  capital  investments  of their choice."30  The 
monies  could be spent at universities  or colleges  as well  government  certified 
training  and apprenticeship  programs.  Monies  not spent on human  capital 
investments  would  earn  interest and become  available  at a normal  age of 
retirement. 
This  idea has merit.  It has  the virtue  of letting  individuals  decide 
"  What  evidence  we  have  on  the  GED  (generalized  equivalency  diploma) 
suggests  that it is of little value.  See Cameron  and Heckman,  1993. 
3o  Haveman  (1988), 169. 49 
how  they can best benefit  from post-high  school  training.  Unlike  proposals 
for vouchers  at the elementary  or high  school  level,  there  is nothing 
revolutionary  about  individual  choice  over post-high  school  training.  In the 
U.S. most  decisions  about human  capital  investment  after high  school  are made 
by young  adults  and their families.  While  they may make mistakes,  it is not 
clear  that governments  can do any better.  Indeed,  one could argue  that we 
already have  a form of education  voucher  for‘young  adults. 
can be used  to finance  education  in a university,  community 
apprenticeship. 
Another  virtue  of this idea is that it is universal. 
Veterans  benefits 
college,  or 
All young people 
would  have  an opportunity  to use these monies,  regardless  of their high  school 
academic  performance  or family background.  Of course,  young people  from poor 
families with  limited  access  to loans and savings would  reap a particular 
benefits  from this voucher.  The voucher  would  open up opportunities  that 
might  not be otherwise  available  to them.  However,  unlike  present  training 
programs  that are targeted  on the disadvantaged,  there would be no stigma 
associated  with using  this voucher.  Everyone would have  an opportunity  to use 
the voucher.  If a young person  approached  an employer  about an apprenticeship 
that is financed  out of this capital  account,  the employer  would have no 
reason  to view  this person  as somehow  disadvantaged. 
Furthermore,  this voucher  plan would  force a market  test upon providers 
of training.  This contrasts  with  the current  situation  where  governments 
paternalistically  decide  on the quality  and quantity  of training  offered  to 
what  is essentially  a captive population  of trainees.  With  a voucher, 
organizations  that provide  training would have  to provide  effective  training 
in the sense  that some fraction  of the trainees  actually  obtain  good jobs. 50 
One can imagine  a government  or "Consumer Reports"  type organization 
collecting  and disseminating  information  on program  success  rates. 
Of course,  these vouchers  are no panacea.  Since  there would  be a 
potential  for fraud and abuse by providers  of training,  the federal  government 
may have  to regulate  the market  for providers  through  some form of 
certification  program.  Moreover,  as pointed  out by Haveman,  assignment  of the 
account  to private  creditors  would have  to be prohibited.  Finally,  there  is a 
risk that the vouchers  would  encourage  people  to drop out of high  school  and 
substitute  alternative  forms of training  for high  school  training. 
where basic  academic  skills  are increasingly  important,  that would 
undesirable.  In order  to maintain  incentives,  the vouchers  should 
available  to high  school  graduates. 
Restrict  Immigration  of Unskilled  Workers 
In a world 
be 
only be 
Finally,  as part of a strategy  for reducing  the supply  of unskilled 
workers,  governments  should move  to sharply  restrict  immigration  of the 
unskilled.  Between  1981 and 1987 more  than four million  legal  immigrants 
entered  the United  States.  Rates  of legal immigration  and the ratio of 
immigrants  to native  births  are equal  to or above  those that existed  at the 
turn of the century.31  Moreover,  this legal flow is increasingly  a flow of 
unskilled  workers.  All  indications  are that the flow of illegal  immigrants 
both  substantial  and even less skilled  than the legal flow.32  Thus,  current 
immigration  policy  tends to expand  the supply of unskilled  workers. 
Policies  should be  implemented  that restrict  this influx of unskilled 
31  Borjas  (1990), page  6. 
32  Borjas  (1990), Chapter 4. 
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workers.  In evaluating  legal entrants,  greater  emphasis  should be placed  on 
immigrant  skill and education  and less on family  ties.  In addition,  greater 
efforts  should be made  to reduce  illegal entry.  "To do this,  it will be 
necessary  to adopt a counterfeit-proof  identification  system;  to tighten 
restrictions  on the use of fraudulent  documents;  to enhance border  patrol 
activities;  to devote more  funds and manpower  to the enforcement  of employer 
sanctions;  and to place  fines on illegal  immigrants who are apprehended  and 
found to be employed."33  In the long run, such policies  would  have  the 
beneficial  effect  of reducing  the supply of unskilled  adults. 
B. The Demand  side. 
For purposes  of increasing  the job opportunities  confronting  academic 
underachievers,  one can reasonably  question whether  supply  side interventions 
are sufficient.  Suppose,  for example,  that all members  of an age cohort 
increased  their skill  level.  There would  still be a group with  comparatively 
low skills who would  end up in the lesser jobs.  Unless  those  lesser jobs 
improve  in quality,  nothing  is gained.  Alternatively,  increases  in the supply 
of skilled workers  may simply drive down wages  and not greatly  increase well- 
being.  If a nation  increases  its stock of trained human  capital,  is it 
plausible  to assume  that a new and better  mix of jobs will  suddenly  appear? 
From this perspective  government  intervention  on the demand  (employer) 
side of the labor market  makes  sense.  Governments  can formulate  trade,  tax, 
and expenditure  policies  so as to encourage  stable jobs with high wages.34  A 
33  Briggs  (1992), page  32. 
34  See Bulow and Summers  (1986) for a theoretical model where such policies 
improve economic  welfare. range  of policies  are possible. 
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Unemployment  insurance  provides  a good example  of a demand  side policy 
intervention  that could discourage  temporary,  high-turnover  jobs.  The present 
U.S. unemployment  insurance  system  arguably  subsidizes  such jobs. 
Unemployment  insurance  is financed  through an "experience  rated"  tax on 
employers,  whereby  employers  that produce  more  layoffs  (and associated 
unemployment  insurance  expenditures)  are supposed  to pay higher  taxes.  A 
large body  of evidence  indicates  that the tax is imperfect  in the sense  that 
employers  bear  less than the full cost of an additional  layoff,  i.e., the 
unemployment  insurance  received  by a laid off worker  exceeds  the extra  taxes 
paid by  the employer.  For example,  over  70% of the workers  in South Carolina 
are employed  by  firms that bear  less than the full cost of an additional 
layoff,  and most  of these workers  are in firms that pay nothing  for an 
additional  layoff.35  Such policies  result  in both more  layoffs and a subsidy 
to firms and industries  with high-turnover  jobs.  Indeed,  recent  evidence 
suggests  that state UI policies  influence  the industrial  composition  of 
states,  causing  a shift of employment  away from more  stable jobs  in the 
service  industry  and into more volatile  jobs  in the construction  industry.36 
A reasonable  demand  side intervention  would be to move  toward more perfect 
experience  rating. 
One can, of course,  go further.  America's  trading partners  often pursue 
policies  that amount  to demand  side interventions  aimed at increasing  the 
availability  of "good" jobs.  Japan,  for example,  uses  trade and industrial 
policy  to encourage  growth  of capital  intensive manufacturing  firms, which  in 
35  Anderson  and Meyer  (1993),  page  S82. 
36  Deere  (1991). 53 
turn provide  long-term  jobs with extensive  training  and comparatively  high 
wages.  The German  government  sharply constrains  the conditions  under which 
employers  can dismiss  workers,  while  essentially  subsidizing  alternatives  to 
layoffs  (e.g., early  retirement  or payment  of unemployment  insurance  for a 
shortened  work week).37  In France  the government  not only sets high minimum 
wages,  but also  frequently  imposes nationally  bargained  wage  settlements  on 
non-union  firms. 
Would  adoption  of such policies  in the U.S. have  a positive  effect  on 
academic  underachievers?  There would  seem to be good grounds  for skepticism. 
First, while  such policies  may  lead to better  jobs  for the average worker, 
they may actually  harm  the least skilled.  For example,  high minimum  wages  can 
lead to reduced  job opportunities  and unemployment  for unskilled  workers. 
Similarly,  job protection  policies  like Germany's  can cause employers  to be 
particularly  cautious  about hiring  unskilled  and inexperienced  workers. 
. . . Given uncertainty,  dismissal  protection  may likewise  act as a 
disincentive  toward hiring  unskilled  labor even in the absence  of 
structural  change.  If firing  costs are considerable,  firms will 
prefer  hiring  such job applicants  whose higher  marginal  value 
product  permits  a longer-term  employment  perspective  even through 
bad  times,  thereby  avoiding  the incidence  of dismissal  costs 
altogether.38 
Second,  there  is reason  to worry  that job protection  policies  would  lead 
to less flexible  labor markets.  Such policies  cause employers  to react more 
slowly  to changes  in demand,  and thereby contribute  to more  serious 
recessions.  Although  this theoretical  argument  does not enjoy  solid empirical 
support,  it makes  one cautious  about government  imposed job protection 
37  Abraham  and Houseman,  (1993) Chapter  2 
38  Buechtemann  (1993), page  11. policies. 
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Third,  for purposes  of helping  academic  underachievers,  a Japanese  style 
industrial  and technology  policy  is not particularly  attractive.  In a world 
where  industries  must  quickly  respond  to an ever-changing  international 
marketplace,  such policies  run the risk of creating  long-run  allocative 
inefficiencies.  Moreover,  even  if the U.S.  government  could operate  an 
effective  industrial  policy,  it is not clear that this would  help  academic 
underachievers.  The above empirical  work  casts doubt on the idea of 
government  encouraging  specific  industries  in order  to provide  academic 
underachievers  with  a path  to economic  security.  And a policy  that creates 
good jobs by promoting  industry  "winners"  and culling  industry  "losers" may 
not create  jobs  for unskilled  workers.  Indeed, consider  the 1980s defense 
build-up  as an example  of a government  policy  that created  "good" jobs. 
Expansion  of firms  like Grumman  or Boeing,  or development  of high-technology 
weapons,  tends  to involve  skilled workers  and create high wage jobs.  Although 
the defense build  up may have had an indirect effect  on academic 
underachievers  during  the 198Os,  there is no reason  to believe  that the effect 
was  significant.  It certainly  was not sufficient  to check  the declining 
fortunes  of unskilled  workers. 
To conclude,  if governments  are to help academic  underachievers  cope 
with  a world  of limited  employment  opportunities,  then the principal  place  to 
intervene  is on the supply  side.  Governments  should actively  pursue  a policy 
of sharply  reducing  the supply  of unskilled  workers.  This can be done through 
training vouchers,  enhanced  early education,  and immigration  reform.  The 
primary  beneficiaries  of such policies  will be academic  underachievers  who are 
willing  and able to obtain  skills.  Such policies  will, however,  also 55 
indirectly  benefit  those who are unable  or unwilling  to obtain  skills.  By 
reducing  the surplus  of unskilled  workers,  such a policy  will  enhance 
unskilled  wage  and employment  opportunities. 
VII.  Conclusion 
This paper began by asking what will happen  to young  people  with  low 
reading  and mathematical  test scores.  Are  such people  consigned  to a life of 
unemployment  and low wages,  or are there paths by which  some fraction will 
find a degree  of financial  security?  The empirical  work  sought  to determine 
whether  such paths  exist.  The results were not very  encouraging.  Although 
some academic  underachievers  did attain  a degree  of financial  security,  they 
evidently  took many  different  paths  to that end.  One can not point  to a set 
of early jobs or early  training  experiences  that provide  an  "elevator"  to 
higher  wages  and full employment. 
Although  government  should help academic  underachievers,  the evidence 
presented  here  does not provide  a strong basis  for intervention  on the demand 
side of the labor market.  Rather,  the best way  to help  these young unskilled 
workers  is through  supply  side interventions.  Enhanced  early education, 
universal  training  vouchers  for adults,  and limitations  on immigration  of 
unskilled  workers  can promote  an environment  where  academic  underachievers 
have  at least some opportunity  for upward mobility. 56 
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Table  1 
Fraction  of all Jobs  that Require  a College  Degree 
1960, 1976, 1986, 2000 
Require  Do not Require 
Year  College  Degree  ColleEe  Denree 
1960  15.3%  84.5% 
1976  21.7  80.0 
1986  25.1  74.8 
2000  27.3  72.7 
Source:  Rumberger  (1981) and Mishel  and Teixeira  (1990) analyses 
of the Occmational  Outlook  Handbook. 61 
Table  2 
Annual  Rate of Change  in Skills  Levels 
Due to Changing  Employment  Patterns,  1960-1985" 
Period  II 
Job Skill  I  1960-70  1 1970-80  1  1980-85 
Substantive  Complexity 
General  Educational  Development 
Interactive  Skills 
Motor  Skills 
0.69%  0.46%  0.28% 
0.36  0.22  0.13 
0.26  0.22  0.03 
0.07  -0.14  -0.04 
a  From Howell  and Wolff  (1991), Table  3, p. 491. 
General  Educational  Develooment.  A DOT index of 
and reasoning  skills. 
mathematical,  language 
Substantive  Comolexity.  A factor analytic  index based  on DOT measures 
of required  verbal  and numerical  aptitude,  specific  vocational  training 
time,  temperament  for nonrepetitive  activities,  and temperament  for 
activities  of an abstract  and creative  nature. 
Interactive  Skills.  A DOT index of the extent  to which  a job requires 
"people"  skills.  These  range  from "high" skills  of mentoring  and 
negotiating  to "low" skills  of serving  and taking  instructions. 
Motor  Skills.  A factor analytic  index based  on DOT measures  of required 
motor  coordination,  manual  dexterity,  and ability  to set up machines  and 
perform  precision  manual  work. 62 
Table  3 
EMPLOYMENT  DISTRIBUTION  BY EXPERIENCE,  EDUCATION,  SEX 
FOR 1973, 1979, AND 1988. 
All Experience  bevels  0 - 9 Years  Experience 
1973  1979  1988  1973  1979  1988 
Men 
HS Dropout  18%  12%  8%  8%  7%  5% 
HS Graduate  24  23  21  24  23  21 
Some College  9  11  11  13  12  12 
College  Grad  10  12  14  13  14  14 
Women 
HS Dropout  9  7  5  4  3  3 
HS Graduate  19  20  21  20  20  19 
Some College  6  8  11  9  11  13 
College  Grad  6  7  10  8  10  14 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
* Derived  from Bound and Johnson  (1992), Table  1 63 
Table 4 
Percent  of 17-Year Old High  School  Students  Reading  at or above 
Selected  Levels, by Race,  1970-1988 














1970-71  1974-75  1979-80  1983-84  1987-88 
97.7  98.6  99.1  99.1  99.5 
82.0  81.1  84.9  95.8  97.1 
83.5  86.1  87.3  98.9  89.3 
39.7  42.4  43.9  66.0  76.0 
43.3  44.0  44.1  46.3  46.3 
7.5  7.9  6.7  16.3  25.8 
7.5  7.0  6.3  6.5  5.7 
.3  .3  .2  .9  1.9 
Source:  Ina Mullis  and Lunn Jenkins,  The Readine.  Report  Card,  1971-88 
(Princeton:  Educational  Testing  Service,  1990), pp. 63-64 as reproduced  in 
Jencks  (1992), p. 178. 64 
Table  5 
Percent  of 17-Year-Old  High School  Students with 
Math  Skills  or above Selected  Levels, by Race,  1970-1988 
Math  skill  level 
"Basic Operations  and Beginning 
Problem  Solving" 
White 
Black 
1977-78  1981-82  1985-86 
95.8  96.3  98.3 
70.0  75.3  86.0 




57.3  54.5  58.0 
18.0  17.3  21.7 




8.6  6.3  7.6 
.4  .6  .3 
Source:  John  Dossey,  Ina Mullis,  Mary Lindquist,  and Donald  Chambers,  m 
-  (Princeton:  Educational  Testing  Service,  1988), pp. 
141-142  as reproduced  in Jencks  (1992), p. 178. Table  6 
Estimated  Average  Hourly Wages  (In 1988 Dollars) 
By Experience,  Education,  Sex 
For 1973, 1979, and 1988. 
All  Experience  Levels  0 - 9 Years  Experience 
1973  1979  1988  1973  1979  1988 
Men 
HS Dropout  $10.48  $9.78  $8.31  $7.52  $7.20  $5.54 
HS Graduate  12.16  11.34  10.15  9.69  8.96  7.31 
Some College  13.08  12.29  11.60  10.61  9.89  8..51 
College  Grad  15.62  14.27  14.81  12.69  11.38  12.16 
Women 
HS Dropout  6.29  6.22  5.64  5.80  5.48  4.82 
HS Graduate  7.88  7.56  7.34  7.14  6.87  6.18 
Some College  9.30  8.48  8.77  8.91  7.79  7.52 
College  Grad  11.18  9.94  10.81  10.42  9.29  10.00 
65 
' Derived  from Bound and Johnson  (1992), Table  1.  Columns  1 - 3 are computed 
using  their employment  data as weights. 66 
Table  7 
Training  Paths Pursued by Nongraduate  Males Who Were  18-19 in 1966 
(NLS Young Men) 
Training  Path  in 1966  - 1971  Number  Percent 
Completed  More Years  of Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
129,366  30% 
95,316  22% 
18,102  4% 
15,948  4% 
Did Not Complete  More  Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
296,986  70% 
217,650  51% 
37,227  9% 
42.109  _I!23 
Total  426,352  426,352  100%  100% 
Missing  261,557 
Table  8 
Training  Paths Pursued by Nongraduate  Males Who Were  18-19  in 1966 
and Who, by 1978-1981,  Had Attained  SUCCESS  2, i.e., 
Earnings Above  the Poverty Line and Full Time Work 
(NLS Young Men) 
Training  Path 1966  - 1971  Number  Percent 
Completed  More Years  of Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
89,095  34% 
56,547  21% 
18,102  7% 
14,447  5% 
Did Not Complete  More  Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
176,395  66% 





Total  265,490  265,490  100%  100% 67 
Table  9 
Success Rates  for Alternative  Training  Paths, 
Nongraduate  Males who were  18-19 in 1966 
(NLS Young Men) 
Trainine  Path 1966  - 1971 
Completed  More Years  of Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
Did Not Complete  More  Schooling 
SUCCESS  2  SUCCESS  1  SUCCESS  3 
69%  84%  29% 
59%  80%  25% 
100%  100%  52% 
91%  91%  21% 




Obtained  No Other Training 
Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
61%  70%  8% 
50%  82%  22% 
61%  73%  12% 
62%  75%  16% 
SUCCESS  1: Annual  Earnings  in excess  of the U.S.  government  poverty  line 
for a family of four. 
SUCCESS  2: Annual  weeks worked  greater  than or equal  to 48 and annual  earnings 
in excess  of the U.S.  government  poverty  line for a family  of 
four. 
SUCCESS  3: Annual  Earnings  in excess  of $20,000  in 1980. 68 
Table  10 
Linear  Regression  Models  of the Probability  of SUCCESS  1 
Estimated  in a Nongraduate  Subsample  of the 1966 NLS Young Men Data 
(t-statistics  in parentheses) 
Intercept 
Completed  More Years 
of School & Obtained 
No Other Training 
Completed  More Years 
of School  & Obtained 
Employer  Provided 
Training 
Completed  More Years 
of School & Obtained 
Miscellaneous  Training 
Did Not Complete  More 
Years  of School but 
Obtained  Employer 
Provided  Training 
Did Not Complete  More 
Years  of School but 
Obtained  Miscellaneous 
Training 
White 
Disabled  in 1966 
Highest  Grade  Completed 
at Age  19 
Resided  in an SMSA 
in 1966 
AiF  -  19 




















































































































Age - 17  --  __ 
Some Active  Military 
Duty Between  1966 6 1971 
Months  of Active  Military 
Duty Between  1966 & 1971 
Mother's  Education 
__  __ 
--  -- 
--  -- 
Father's  Education  __  __ 
I.Q. 
Region  Variables 
Included? 
Number  of Observations 
R-Square 
__  __ 
No  Yes 
155  155 













--  __ 
__  __ 
Yes  Yes 
405  360 













Table  11 
Industry  and Occupation  Coefficients  in 
Linear  Regression  Models  of the Probability  of Success 
Estimated  in a Nongraduate  Subsample  of the 1966 NLS Young Men 




Durable  Goods 
Manufacturing 
Nondurable  Goods 
Manufacturing 
Transport,  Communi- 
cations,  Utilities 
Wholesale  and 
Retail  Trade 
Finance,  Insurance, 





Farmers  and Farm 
Managers 
Managers,  Officials 
and Proprietors 
Dependent  Variable: 
SUCCESS  SUCCESS  SUCCESS  SUCCESS  Log(Annua1 







































































































































Sales  -0.309  -0.078  -0.034  0.110  0.259 
(0.5)  (0.5)  (0.2)  (0.6)  (0.8) 
Craft,  Foremen, 
and Kindred 
Operatives  and 
Kindred 
Service 
0.235  0.060  -0.134  0.145  0.318 
(0.5)  (0.5)  (0.9)  (1.2)  (1.4) 
0.022  -0.006  -0.131  -0.063  0.120 
(0.1)  (0.1)  (0.9)  (0.5)  (0.5) 
-0.305  -0.158  -0.282  -0.097  -0.101 
(0.6)  (1.1)  (1.6)  (0.7)  (0.4) 
Farm Labor & Foremen  0.035  0.013  0.292  0.111  -0.228 
(0.1)  (0.1)  (0.9)  (0.4)  (0.5) 
Laborers,  Except  Farm  -0.097  -0.078  -0.261  -0.122  -0.065 
(0.2)  (0.6)  (1.7)  (1.0)  (0.3) 
Occupation  Missing  -0.692  -0.730 
(4.0)  (3.5) 
Number  of Observations 
-0.618 
(1.3) 
246  772  748 
-0.249  -1.453 
(1.5)  (4.3) 
772  748 
R-SQUARE  0.291  0.213  0.154  0.149  0.212 
71 
Also  included  in Models  were  the following variables:  Disabled  in 1966, White, 
Age - 19, Age - 18, Age - 17, Active  Military  Duty Between  1966 and 1971, 
Months  of Active  Military  Duty Between  1966 and 1971, Highest  Grade  Completed 
when Age  19, and Regional  dummies,  Resided  in an SMSA in 1966. 72 
Table  12 
Training  Paths Pursued by Nongraduate  Males 
Who Were Age  18-19 in 1966 and 1979 
TraininP  Path 
Completed  More Years  of Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
Did Not Complete  More  Schooling 
And 
And 
Obtained  No Other Training 
Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Total  Observations  (weighted) 
Total  Observations  (unweighted) 
Attrition  rate  (weighted) 
1966-1971  1979-1984 
Young Men Data  Youth  Cohort  Data 
31%  26% 
25%  17% 
3%  1% 
3%  8% 
69%  74% 





100%  100% 
419,789  1,138,426 
252  585 
39%  10% 73 
Table  13 
Success  Rates based  on SUCCESS  1 for Alternative  Training  Paths; 
Nongraduate  Males who were  18 - 19 in 1966 and 1979 
Trainine  Path 
Fraction  that Attain  Success  1 
1966  1979 
Younn Men Data  Youth  Cohort  Data 
Completed  More Years  of Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
Did Not Complete  More  Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
88%  54% 
85%  52% 
100%  65% 
100%  58% 
70%  57% 
73%  56% 
76%  81% 
41%  59% 
75%  56% 
Table  14 
Success Rates based  on SUCCESS  2 for Alternative  Training  Paths; 
Nongraduate  Males who were  18 - 19 in 1966 and 1979 
Training  Path 
Fraction  that Attain  Success  2 
1966  1979 
Young Men Data  Youth  Cohort  Data 
Completed  More Years  of Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
61%  44% 
56%  42% 
74%  57% 
100%  48% 
Did Not Complete  More  Schooling 
And Obtained  No Other Training 
And Obtained  Other Training 
Provided  by Employer 
Miscellaneous 
53%  44% 
57%  44% 
69%  59% 
4%  43% 
Total  56%  44% 74 
Table  15 
Sample Means  and Linear  Regression  Models  of the Probability  of SUCCESS  1 
Estimated  in a Nongraduate  Subsample  of the 
1966 NLS Young Male and the 1979 NLS Youth  Cohort 
(t-statistics  in parentheses) 
Sample Means  Regressions 
Intercept 
1979  1966 
__  0.305 
(1.8) 
Completed  More Years 
of School  & Obtained 
No Other Training 







Completed  More Years 
of School  6 Obtained 
Employer  Provided 
Training 




Completed  More Years 
of School  & Obtained 
Miscellaneous  Training 




Did Not Complete  More 
Years  of School but 
Obtained  Employer 
Provided  Training 




Did Not Complete  More 
Years  of School but 
Obtained  Miscellaneous 
Training 
0.051  0.101  -0.220  0.070 
(2.0)  (1.4) 




Disabled  when  the Panel  0.103  0.050  -0.105 
Began  (1.3) 
0.015 
(0.2) 
Highest  Grade  Completed 
at Age  19 




Resided  in an SMSA 
when  the Panel Began 




Age - 19  0.174  0.207  0.093 
(1.4) 
0.010 
(0.2) Age - 18 
Age - 17 
Some Active  Military 
Duty  in the First Five 
Years  of the Panel 
Months  of Active  Military 
Duty  in the First Five 
Year  of the Panel 
North  East 
0.201  0.276 
0.277  0.245 
0.254  0.100 
6.903  2.910 
0.145  0.187 
North  Central  0.176  0.204 
South  0.612  0.394 
West  0.067  0.197  __ 
Mother's  Education 
Father's  Education 
Number  of Observations 
8.524  9.381 








0.006  -0.003 

























Table  16 
Industry  and Occupation: 
Sample Means  and Regression  Coefficients  from Linear  Regression 
Models  of the Probability  of SUCCESS  1 and SUCCESS  2. 
Based on 1966 NLS Young Men and 1979 NLS Youth  Data 
(t-statistics  in parentheses) 
Sample Means  SUCCESS  1  SUCCESS  2 
Industry 






1979  1966  1979  1966  1979 
(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
0.042  __ 
0.004  0.085 
Mining  0.101  0.097 
Durable  Goods 
Manufacturing 
Nondurable  Goods 
Manufacturing 
Transport,  Communi- 
cations,  Utilities 
Wholesale  and 
Retail  Trade 
0.199  0.036 
0.095  0.022  0.230  0.027  0.767 
(1.1)  (0.2)  (3.1)  (0.2) 
0.050  0.029  0.255 
(1.2) 
0.167  0.192  0.309 
(1.5) 
Finance,  Insurance, 
and Real  Estate 
0.014  0.009  0.226 
(0.9) 





0.010  0.016  0.354 
(1.1) 
0.223  0.353  0.410 
(1.6) 
Occuoation 
Professional  0.026  0.014  --  --  __ 
Farmers  and Farm 
Managers 
0.010  0.001  -0.083  0.488  0.521 
(0.3)  (0.8)  (1.5) 
0.937 
(2.2) 
0.031  1.575 
(0.2)  (3.2) 
0.029 
(0.2) 
0.205  -0.001  0.579  0.033 
(1.0)  (0.0)  (2.4)  (0.2) 
0.207  -0.147  0.544  -0.013 
(1.0)  (0.9)  (2.3)  (0.1) 
-0.046  0.758  0.008 
(0.3)  (3.0)  (0.0) 
-0.082  0.807  -0.012 
(0.6)  (3.3)  (0.1) 
-0.039  0.609  -0.183 
(0.2)  (2.0)  (0.7) 
-0.194  0.601  -0.139 
(1.3)  (2.4)  (0.9) 
-0.250  0.959  -0.028 
(1.2)  (2.6)  (0.1) 
-0.246  1.133  -0.040 






Managers,  Officials, 
and Proprietors 
Clerical  and Kindred 
Sales 
Craft,  Foreman, 
and Kindred 
Operatives  and 
Service 
Farm Labor  and 
Foremen 











































































































Estimated  in NLS Young Men and NLS Youth  Cohort  samples  of male high  school 
graduates  and nongraduates  who did not complete  additional  formal  education 
after  their 19th birthday.  Also  included  in models  were  the following 
variables:  Disabled  when  the Panel Began, White,  Age = 19, Age - 18, Age - 
17, Some Active  Military  Duty  in the First Five Years  of the Panel, Months  of 
Active  Military  Duty  in the First Five Years  of the Panel, Highest  Grade 
Completed  when Age  19, Resided  in an SMSA when  the Panel Began,  and Regional 
dummies. 78 
Table  17 
Industry  and Occupation: 
Sample Means  and Regression  Coefficients  from Linear  Regression 
Models  of the Probability  of SUCCESS 4 and Log  (Annual Earnings). 
Based  on 1966 NLS Young Men and 1979 NLS Youth  Data 




Durable  Goods 
Manufacturing 
Nondurable  Goods 
Manufacturing 
Transport,  Communications, 
and Utilities 
Wholesale  and Retail 
Trade 
Finance,  Insurance, 
and Real  Estate 
Services 
Public Administration 
Industry  Missing 
Occunation 
Farmers  and Farm 
Managers 
Managers,  Officials 
and Proprietors 









































































































Clerical  and Kindred 
Sales 
Craft,  Foremen, 
and Kindred 
Operatives  and Kindred 
Private  Household 
Farm Labor  and 
Foremen 
Laborers,  Except  Farm 
Occupation  Missing 
Number  of Occupations 





























































-0.216  -1.303  -1.237 
(0.5)  (3.9)  (0.9) 
1761  634  1615 
0.162  0.305  0.217 
Estimated  in NLS Young Men and NLS Youth  Cohort  samples  of male high  school 
graduates  and nongraduates  who did not complete  additional  formal  education 
after  their 19th birthday.  Also  included  in models  were  the following 
variables:  Disabled  when  the Panel Began, White,  Age - 19, Age - 18, Age - 
17, Some Active  Military  Duty  in the First Five Years  of the Panel, Months  of 
Active  Military  Duty  in the First Five Years  of the Panel, Highest  Grade 
Completed  when Age  19, Resided  in an SMSA when  the Panel Began,  and Regional 
dummies. 